UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE AESTHETIC RESPONSE
An Antinomy and Its Resolution

MILTON C. NAHM

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
1933

THE AESTHETIC RESPONSE
An Antinomy and Its Resolution

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

MILTON C. NAHM

PHILADELPHIA
1933

R. UNIV.
BIBLIOTHEEK
LEIDEN

THE AESTHETIC RESPONSE: AN ANTINOMY AND ITS RESOLUTION

MILTON C. NAHM

Both the literature of art and the analyses of the aesthetic response contain, in regard to the ennobling or to the degrading functions of art, opinions so contradictory that one is reminded of the ancient story of the two knights who met at the crossroads. It will be remembered that they approached from opposite directions. At the meeting point of the road a statue had been erected. The first knight swore that the shield of the statue was white. The other swore with equal vehemence that it was black. That it was both black and white the knights discovered only after they had shattered their spears at joust to settle the question by strength of arms. In like manner men have given to art two characters so completely opposed that the creator of art appears at once as he who stirs and "muddies" our lives with sensations, feelings or emotions it were better to avoid and as he who epitomizes civilization and is perhaps the most important factor in its progress. The tenacity with which art has been treated from these constantly opposed views makes it apparent that we must seek the source of the disagreement in art itself and not in the prejudice of the advocates of one or the other theory. Historically, aesthetic theory has accepted one or the other of the possibilities. We shall accept what history and analysis indicate: Art contains two apparently incompatible elements. An antinomy results in any attempt to analyze the content of the aesthetic response. We shall attempt to state the antinomy and to indicate the method of its resolution.

For the sake of clarity we may indicate and illustrate at the outset the two fundamentally opposed elements in art:

1. Art is sensational and emotional. Its appeal is to that element in man's nature ordinarily suppressed and kept in control by his "higher self" or by his rational nature. The classical formulation of this view of art is that of Plato:

> And poetical imitation has the same effect on lust and anger and all those experiences of desire and pleasure or pain which, as we believe, ac-

company all our actions. For it waters them and makes them grow when they ought to starve with drought; and it gives them power over us when we ought to subject them, and so to make ourselves better and happier instead of falling into misery and wickedness.[1]

2. Art is ennobling and inspiring. By it man is exalted to a new conception of himself and to a realization of his potentialities. Because of its effect upon him, man becomes a creator. The Platonic Socrates enunciates certain of the characteristics of this view of art,[2] but for its clearest formulation in the literature one may turn to Longinus' *de Sublimitate*:

> What then could have been in the minds of those inspired writers who aimed at perfection of style and yet thought little of minute correctness? Surely this, among other things, that nature has set our human family apart from the humble herd of brutes, and has bidden us to the pageant of life and of the whole universe, that we might both be spectators of the mighty drama and acquit ourselves as worthy actors there.[3]

As has been indicated, each of the two positions given above may be defended with a logic so sound that the defender seems to be in an unassailable coign of vantage. There arises, therefore, an antinomy: Art is at once degrading and inspiring. Through it, man yields to his baser nature. Yet, in so yielding, he is uplifted and made conscious of his progress and of the advance of his way of living over that of the brute.

With the hope of resolving the antinomy we shall leave such descriptive treatment of art and turn to postulates. The primary postulate will concern art itself: "Art is a creation by a being in a society of beings already definable with reference to

---

[1] *Republic*, Bk. 10, 606d.

[2] *Apology*, 22. "Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them."

[3] XXXV. 4–5. That this antinomy is not a purely academic problem is indicated by criticism itself. Ben Jonson in the *Prologue* to *Everyman in His Humour* attacks the then new Shakespearean romantic comedy on the very grounds that its appeal is emotional:

> "He rather prays you will be pleas'd to see
> One such today, as other plays should be:
> Where neither chorus wafts you o'er the seas,
> Nor creaking throne comes down the boys to please;"

In contrast, Schiller, in the *Aesthetische Briefe* holds that art is that factor in life by which man achieves humanity.

purposes other than art.''[4] As a corollary, we may add that this creation is always in a sensuous medium.

As is indicated by our postulate, art does not originate *ex nihilo*. It is equally true that theories involving ''aesthetic indirection'' or ''creative imagination'' must not preclude the assumption that the artistic object may serve functions other than that of arousing an aesthetic response. For, as concerns the origin of art, modern archaeology and ethnology indicate clearly that implements serving a definite function are decorated after their purpose has been clearly understood and utilized. Cups fashioned for votive offerings, as well as cathedrals as places of worship, fit into the general patterns of man's teleological activities. The Bushman or the Hottentot constructs his sculptured figures primarily for the purpose of ''sympathetic magic,'' for by his skill in producing an image of his enemy or of his intended prey he secures domination over the enemy or the prey itself. Similarly, one may indicate, as have done Grosse,[5] Hirn[6] and others, that the desire for personal decoration and adornment, as an attraction for sexual selection or as distinctive marks of clans or social position, give rise to tattooing and the practise of cicatrice. The dance and drama have their origins in ceremonies primarily associated with the fertilization of crops and of the tribe or with religions or cult rites. Art has its presuppositions in the sex impulse, in utility, in religion. The pottery of the Pueblo Indians, the nail fetishes of the Congo, the wall paintings of the Kalihari desert, the paintings of Raphael, or the *David* of Michaelangelo—all have teleological references other than art and art most clearly of all man's activities retains its setting in its social background. By this is not meant that all art is technical.[7] It does mean, however, that fine arts as well as technical arts deal with materials and the

[4] E. A. Singer, Jr., *Esthetic and The Rational Ideal*, II, p. 260, *Journal of Philosophy*, (1926).

[5] *The Beginnings of Art.*

[6] *The Origins of Art.*

[7] Technical arts are not interchangeable. Fine arts are interchangeable. But a fresco by Masaccio, nevertheless, does perform a technical function in fitting into a prescribed location and in arousing a religious mood. If interpreted this way, *i.e.*, by its origin, it necessarily fits into a teleological setting apart from art.

material may have a function before or after it serves the purpose of arousing the aesthetic response. There is, however, an aesthetic function served by fine art over and above the technical function. A sensuous medium is common to a fresco by Massaccio and to the baroque chapel in the Mosque at Cordoba but in the one case the aesthetic function is fulfilled, in addition to the religious function, while in the other, the aesthetic function is not served.

In writing of primitive man's artistic endeavors Reinach says:[8]

> The clan lived on meat. In reproducing the likeness of the animals which furnished their food, they believed they increase their number and stimulate their multiplication. The practice of bewitching a living person by inflicting injury or destruction upon his image with the intent of harming the living is a phenomenon of the same kind, only inspired by an opposite sentiment. The notion that art is a form of play is perhaps nothing but a modern prejudice; art began as a ritual or act of magic. And when we speak today of the "magic of art," we do not know how truly right we are.

However, with whatever ease and from whatever wealth of authority one may indicate art's presuppositions in the purposive activities of man, it is quite another task to establish the accompanying implication that art itself is teleological or purposive. Those who refuse to admit purpose into art may point to a well-established tradition in aesthetic. That tradition begins with the Pythagoreans' attempt to reduce music to its mathematical relations. It reaches its highest development in modern aesthetic theory in the attempts of Fechner and Zeising to ascertain the most beautiful geometrical form. Experiment demonstrated that the most pleasing figure was that which approximated to the ratio of 21 to 34.[9] The general assumption of such ateleological treatment of art may be summarized as follows: Whatever be the aesthetic element in art, that element is reducible to simple, formal, geometrical rela-

[8] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Vol. 1, p. 131, Paris, 1905. *Cf.* Obermaier, *El Hombre Fósil;* Sollas, *Ancient Hunters;* Goldenweiser, *Ancient Civilizations*, p. 183: "This ceremonial function of artistic objects as symbols of religio-mythological and social values represents the most significant cultural aspect of primitive art."

[9] *Vide* Fechner, *Vorschule d. Aesthetik.*

tions. The ideal of such systems would be the reduction of the ratios, let us say, of music as evolved by the Pythagoreans (*i.e.*, 6 : 8 : 9 : 12)[10] and the most beautiful forms of paintings and architectural columns to a common mathematical formula and by this formula to explain the existence and effect of art which assumes such complex and varied forms.

Let us assume that art is ateleological. We are met, first of all, by the complexity of art which we have already indicated. The usual method of such a theory, when the theorist is faced for example by the incongruity of a modern skyscraper with the formal rules for symmetry laid down by Vitruvius, is to deny that the example cited is art. But such pruning of the field of art reveals the presence of a double-edged sword; for if, let us say, the distortions of Cezanne or of the primitive sculpture of the Africans are not art, then, by definition, the shortened-syllables of *King Lear* are likewise not art.

Our assumption that ateleological theories cannot account for the complexity of art might still be denied validity by one who, by definition, regarded only classical or formally proportioned objects to be art. However, the second difficulty inherent in such ateleological definitions would demand reconsideration of the formula, for such a reduction of art to its formal elements still leaves unsolved the chief problem: Why is the formal and simpler ratio more satisfactory to the perceiver?[11] But to answer the question, "Why is simplicity pleasing,?" we must leave ateleological postulation, for it is one matter to ask what formal rule art must follow and quite another to inquire, "What common purpose (of pleasingness or satisfactoriness) must art serve, to be art?"

We have indicated the impossibility of defining art ateleologically. We are left then with no alternative but to define art teleologically, *i.e.*, to define it in such a manner that there is

10 *Vide* Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pp. 45–47.

11 *Vide* Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, p. 373: "The point, then, of the very relations into which the formalist analyses simpler cases of beauty seems not to lie in their satisfactoriness to perception, but in their satisfactoriness to the intellectual craving for explanation. As numerical or geometrical relations, apart from sense-perception, one is in no way preferred to another."

"no limit to the mechanisms which may be found to serve the purpose which binds the elements together."[12]

Having accepted a teleologically defined art, it yet remains necessary to discover the common purpose that binds the elements together. Accompanying our definition of art we included a corollary to the effect that the medium of art is of necessity a sensuous one. The customary language used in the description of art reveals the important consequences of the artist's selecting sensuous media: We commonly say that a statue by Praxiteles has serenity. We sense tragedy in Rodin's *Burghers of Calais* and in the Niobe group. We feel the fury of the elements of nature in *King Lear,* the tragic loss in *Macbeth,* or the pity of the tale of Paolo and Francesca in the *Inferno.* We say that Herrick's poems are cheerful and we have a feeling of exaltation at Milton's description of Satan in *Paradise Lost.* We are aware of an erotic quality in Wagner. We may feel depressed by Dostoievski, excited by Defoe, amused by the Dogberries of Shakespeare, or shocked by his Iago. Similarly, architecture may mean to us the feeling of aspiring heights at Chartres or the upward thrust and downward push of the roof of the Parthenon. In each case, the mechanisms differ. But there is one essential identity in the examples cited. Art functions in every case to arouse a feeling or sensation in the observer.[13] This, apparently, is either the function of art or a function essential to its ultimate one.

---

[12] E. A. Singer, Jr., *Mind as Behavior,* p. 58.

[13] Even a highly formalized design does this. *Cf.* Rhys Carpenter, *The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art,* p. 31, *et seq.* Carpenter's description of the geometrical design of a sculped figure of Herakles, one of the pedimental figures from Aegina, describes the design and its effect upon the observer:

> "It can scarcely be accident that—the figure patternizes to an intensely formal presentation in which an almost diagrammatic indication of the mechanics of an archer drawing his bow dominates the pattern. In the shooting of an arrow two forces are prominent, the strain of the bow-string back-drawn and the impetus of the released arrow on its flight. The strain and the direction-of-flight are nearly at right angles to the body of the archer.—In the Aeginetan warrior every line that is not suggestive of these forces is rigorously altered or suppressed.—
>
> "What is the emotional value of this abstract pattern? That would be hard to say.—But that I am affected (however unanalyzably, however vaguely, as though by a dream without characters or scene) I can honestly maintain; and as the lines and surfaces are changed and the

The matter, however, does not rest here. What we have described as simple feeling or sensation is characterized by a specific reaction or behavior on our part. We, in James' words, are "provoked to characteristic alterations in attitude and visage. Breathing, circulation and other organic functions are affected." In other words, we are affected emotionally—or, in the usual language of art, *we are moved.* This, then, is the common purpose of art and its common teleology:[14] That common element that binds the variety of art objects together will be the purposive one *of affecting or moving* the perceiver.

An examination of our problem to this point has forced the acceptance of a teleological definition of art. With that acceptance we must also be prepared to face certain implications which the history of aesthetic has avoided in curious ways. Primarily, our definition of art implies that art, in moving us, gives rise to an emotional response in us and, as a corollary, it has been implied that the medium of art is sensuous. In opposition to this point of view, there are two and only two arguments: The first postulates as necessary for aesthetics the conception of a transcendant "beauty"; the second introduces the alternative of "aesthetic emotions." As regards the first theory, it is argued that while the particular work of art moves us and, in order to do so, must be sensuous, we have overlooked the common factor—usually termed beauty—which really unifies art and is itself outside the sphere of the emotional. That is, it might be admitted that we are moved or affected by *Oedipus Rex* and by *Macbeth* and we are stirred and affected by Debussy's *La Mer.* Yet, while this may be the condition *sine qua non* of any particular work of art, there still remains in the aesthetic response an element that transcends emotion. This element, supposed to

---

pattern changes with them, I can appreciate that my affect alters *pari passu.*"

[14] Cf. Hegel, *Aesthetik,* Division of the Subject:

"We must reject the idea that it is only a coincidence when some natural object is used as a significant form (*i.e.,* concrete and sensuous). Art adopts such form not just because it is to hand nor because nothing else is to hand; the definiteness of subject-matter implies the possibility of external actualization, in fact of sensuous expression.—*The outward form by which the subject-matter becomes object of perception or imagination has no purpose except to appeal to our heart and mind.*"

transcend the emotionally stirring content of art, can only be beauty, as it is interpreted as a universal or as transcendental.

We may take as an example of this transcendental method the statement of Maritain in his *Art et Scholastique*:[15] "Nulle forme d'art, si parfaite qu'elle soit, ne peut enfermer en soi la beauté, comme la Vierge a contenu son Créateur." The transcendental beauty may exist abstractly but the beautiful object, the work of art, cannot do so, for it must appeal to our senses. In this situation Maritain finds an antinomy growing out of "abstract art," *i.e.*, an art that attempts by an appeal solely to the intellect, to avoid arousing in us an emotional reaction:

> Voilà une lueur métaphysique projetée sur le mouvement qui porte—qui portait hier—notre époque à la recherche de la *musique pure*, de la *peinture pure*, du *théatre pure*, de la *poésie pure*.—Commander à notre art d'être l'art à l'état pur, en s'affranchissant effectivement de toutes ses conditions d'existence dans le sujet humain, c'est vouloir usurper pour lui l'aséité de Dieu.—Essayons de donner quelques précisions. Tout le débat revient à ceci, qu'il y a une antinomie pour l'art (et il n'est pas seul dans ce cas) entre les suprêmes postulations de *l'essence* prise en soi et transcendentalement, et les conditions *d'existence* appelées par cette même essence selon qu'elle est réalisée içi-bas.
>
> Oú conduirait, poussée à ses derniéres extrémités logiques, la notion *d-'art pur-*? À un art parfaitement isolé de tout ce qui n'est pas ses propres régles d'opération et l'objet à créer comme tel, autrement dit séparé, exempté parfaitement désinteressé de l'homme et des choses—.[16]

The transcendentalist's position is clear: Art grows out of a social setting. It functions teleologically, since its primary element is *claritas* and we are affected by it through the most "intellectual" of the senses, vision and audition. Nonetheless, there exists as an idea or as a transcendental, *beauty*. It is a divine attribute. From it, derive all the beauties of art. Yet this transcendental is beyond any possible experience. Indeed, as an ideal, it is unapproachable. In aesthetic theories similar to that of Maritain there is no attempt to bridge the gap between the beautiful and beauty. Nor can it be done, for the beautiful (art) and beauty differ in kind, not in degree. Most contra-

[15] See Appendix A.

[16] *Art et Scholastique*, p. 147 *et seq.*, abridged. That is, art has *claritas*, in Aquinas' sense.

dictory of all, art's primary function, to appeal to the eye and the ear by "claritas," "integritas" and "harmonia" is completely absent from the supposed source of the very artistic objects which man can experience. Thus, to write of beauty as the cause of art comes to be a meaningless task, for the universal and the particular in this case contain not one identical characteristic.

If art can only be defined teleologically because the common element that unifies its diversities is the fact that it affects the observer and if it be admitted that the conception of a transcendental beauty not only does not assist us in our analysis of the aesthetic response but actually involves a contradiction, we must assume that art is sensuous and that our response to it is emotional. Because of the implications involved in the relation of art to the emotions, already clearly enunciated in the quotation from Plato, there has been suggested at various times in aesthetics a view involving the introduction of "aesthetic emotions." We must, therefore, examine the conception of "aesthetic emotions" as an alternative to the view that art appeals to the emotions. The implication of the theory of "aesthetic emotions" is to the effect that our reactions, let us say, to Banquo's ghost in *Macbeth* or to a sunset by Turner are of a different order or of a different kind than those evoked in the usual experience of ghostly circumstances or of the every-day sunset. To this implication is added that which asserts that aesthetic emotions are of a higher order, *i.e.*, less dangerous or "less sensual" than those ordinarily experienced.[17]

To the first argument, one must reply that, as far as the actual experience and reaction is concerned, the source of the sensation which is aroused in us and which evokes the emotion, cannot affect the sensation, *qua* sensation.[18] An aesthetic response

[17] *Cf.* Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 210 (*The End of Art*): "The inferior kind of enjoyment is not to be denied to those who can appreciate only the inferior type of music—but the lower pleasure is not to be taken as the true end of the (musical) art."

[18] *Cf.* Kant, *Kritik d. Pract. Vern.* A. 109. "It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to distinguish between *higher* and *lower* desires—it is of no consequence whence the *idea* of this pleasing object is derived, but only how much it pleases."

involves an actual experience. It can take place only by means of sense organs and the sense organs function identically in aesthetic and in non-aesthetic experience. There are no sense organs equipped to cater solely to art.[19]

To the second implication, that the "aesthetic emotions" are "higher" or "nobler," one may bring the telling argument of those who oppose the theory of qualitative differences in pleasure. Since we are actually dealing with reactions, we must deal with the sensations of pleasure or pain. To say one pleasure is "higher" or "nobler" places the distinction on a qualitative and not upon a quantitative basis, but when this is done, we are ignoring the fact that pleasures or pains differ only in intensity (*i.e.,* quantitatively) and any other distinction involves no longer an analysis of the hedonistic factors with experience but the establishment of an entire system of norms, goods, or values.

To sum up the theory of "aesthetic emotions," we may say that if by the phrase is meant an experience other than those brought about by bodily emotions, there is no means by which the perceptions could take place; if by the phrase is meant a particular emotion, like that aroused by imitation or decoration, this particular emotion is necessarily bodily; if the phrase means a combination of emotions—an experience protracted and constituted of a unity of diverse emotions—we should give this the name of "mood," to which we shall refer later. But the "mood," itself, presupposes emotional responses in no way different from those ordinarily experienced, as regards source or as regards reception by the perceiver. This actually is involved in such a theory of "aesthetic emotions." For with the dichotomy between ordinary and aesthetic emotions comes a contradiction best illustrated by the following quotation, contained in a recent publication. The author asks the question, "Is music, then, the

[19] This, of course, aesthetic history has actually attempted to do. From Plato (compare *Hippias Major,* 298, and *Timeas,* 47B) to Hegel (*Eintheilung, Aesthetik,* yy), it has been an assumption that vision and audition are the sole aesthetic senses and smell, touch and taste have been ruled out. This is due to the Pythagorean teaching that made mathematics the basis for musical appreciation and involved the idea that the eye and the ear were the most intellectual sense organs. The fallacy has been indicated in our dealings with ateleological theories.

language of emotion?''[20] His answer indicates the ultimate contradiction of the theory of ''aesthetic emotions'':

> Music—the language of the emotions, yes; but emotions removed from the sphere of bodily sensation and presented to the listening ear through the sensuous medium of moving, meaningless, wondrous sounds.

If this means anything, it involves a contradiction in terms. A ''listening ear'' that does not hear by the relation of outer stimulus to inner reaction involving bodily sensations could never begin to hear the ''wondrous sounds.'' In the words of William James, ''a purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity—I do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things:—but I say that for *us*, emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable.''[21]

With the elimination of the conceptions of a beauty that transcends experience and of a ''bodiless'' aesthetic emotion, we may accept as a postulate the statement that the aesthetic response is emotional.

If the function of art be to appeal to the emotions or to move us, it follows that if art is successful, it must change us as to our purposes:

> Those who neither stretch the meaning of *the beautiful* to make it include creations verging from the neutral to the hideous, nor yet shrink the meaning of *art* to leave no room within it for the unlovely, are left at no loss for a word to distinguish the modeler of these graceless forms from the artist who has merely aborted. Even the creator of the cold and repellent may have and, to be artist, must have—''*succeeded.*'' Now, only in the accomplishment of a purpose can one succeed or fail, and the real signifi-

[20] *The Meaning of Music*, by L. W. Pratt, pp. 203–4, abridged. The whole quotation follows:

> ''It all depends upon what one means by emotion. It is *not* the language of emotion if that phrase is taken to mean that a given composition is capable of arousing a subjective feeling on the part of the listener. It may, or it may not do this, and whether it does or not is irrelevant to the character of music itself . . .
>
> ''It is perhaps unfortunate for a theoretical understanding of music that these characters of tonal movement, because of their formal affinity to bodily movements, are so frequently described by words which also denote moods and emotions, for these auditory characters are not emotions at all. They merely *sound* the way moods *feel*. Hence the ambiguity of the phrase ''language of the emotions.''

[21] *What is Emotion*, Coll. Essays, p. 255, and *The Emotions*, ed. Psychological Classics, vol. 1, p. 103.

cance of this expression, "success," must be found in the purpose it implies.—Art moves us; and at once to purge the expression of all its mechanical figurativeness, let us accept the common saying,—art moves us *out of ourselves.*—To be "transformed" can mean primarily nothing more than to be thrust into a new class of those classes teleologically defined. It is, then, *to be changed as to one's purpose;* it is to enter on a world in which things are revalued.[22]

To find in art the function or purpose of altering one's purposes in such manner as to cause a revaluation of things necessitates a consideration of the relation of art to science; for where we know best why we change our objectives, we find the motive to lie not in the stirrings of art but in the demonstrations of science. Science indeed is concerned with the improvement of means-to-end, and where one's immediate objective is to acquire the tool best calculated to work one's purpose, science alone can show in what a new means may surpass an old in effectiveness. To be sure, science applied to enhancing man's chances of success in his several undertakings is already a kind of *art,* but an art of the kind called, indifferently, technical art or technical science. This science-art recommends no change of objective, save where the *end* remaining unaltered the objective to be changed is a means. What then can a fine art be, that it may hope to do what a technical art cannot even attempt? How can its "fineness" change one's ultimate end; how can it transform one's teleological nature, and therewith one's valuation of old means in the light of new undertakings? There is one, and so far as may be seen, but one interpretation of experience that holds any promise of an answer. It is an interpretation built on two premises, neither hard to verify:

(1) All lives given over to the pursuit of attainable ends suffer a latent discontent, born of the old but easily forgotten experience that the attainment of all such ends, ends in vanity only and vexation of spirit. To make this "divine" discontent active in stirring thought to seek its cause, and urging will to remove it, may well be the function of an art called *fine* and without tincture of science.

(2) Thought so stirred may fail to find any end that better than our old ambitions promises contentment in its service; or

[22] E. A. Singer, Jr., *Esthetic and the Rational Ideal,* II, p. 259, p. 263 (*abridged*).

thought may find that end to lie where the heart lacks courage to pursue it. In the first case, all that art can do is to furnish life with a way of escape from its world. In the second, art may yet find a way of creating a will heroic enough to embrace its own ideal and hold to it.

Of the theories which offer art as an escape from life, that of Schopenhauer is the best known. For, in Schopenhauer's philosophy, art shares with death the function of offering surcease from the otherwise endless demands of the will, from the otherwise ceaseless strivings and defeats to which all are subject. For Schopenhauer, it is art that offers a temporary state of contemplation, in which the drive of desire ceases. In this state, the object is solely object of contemplation, freed from relations to science, to logic, to ethics. Contemplated as art, any object, for Schopenhauer, may be beautiful. Underlying this conception, however, there lies a contradiction. For, although any object may be beautiful if it be contemplated in the proper fashion and although art may afford a respite, so to contemplate and so to take advantage of such respite requires the use of that very power to control circumstances and to achieve this desire that we have called science. To escape life, one turns to art, but to turn to art involves the desire to do so and to achieve this desired end involves the control of circumstances by science.

Since the theory of art as an escape from life fails, we may now examine art in its function as an aid to the control essential to the achievement of one's desires. That art is related to science has been established, but an important problem yet remains. Is art identical with science, and is it likewise to be defined as the power to get what is desired? If not, what is the relation between the two?

Should we accept the proposition that art and science are identical, we are met at the outset by an insurmountable difficulty: Science, in functioning to control the forces of nature, requires the diminution of illusion and chance. This involves the verification of truth and the elimination of error. Art, on the other hand, accepts literally the illusion that science progressively eliminates. In our response to the artistic qualities of a painting, we are neither concerned with the illusion of three dimensions in a two dimensional rendering in painting, for ex-

ample, nor are we concerned whether the artist has, in fact, used three or two dimensions. A scientist, on the other hand, would be convicted of error, should he accept this illusion of three dimensions as the "fact," for his measurements and examination reveal no depth in a painting. Similarly, to question the veracity of Homer's description of one-eyed Cyclops or to ask whether any living man had the proportions of the figures of the sons in El Greco's *Laocoon* is to leave the realm of art, once and for all.

The position of art in this contrast with science may be generalized. Art is not concerned with edification. It may portray evil, as do Milton in his depiction of Satan and Shakespeare in the figure of Iago, or it may portray holiness, as does Dante in his depiction of Beatrice. It may fulfil either of its ends with equal artistry. Art is not concerned with morality. We are offended by Jones and Pinero because we feel that a foreign element has been introduced in the conclusions of their plays in the moral lessons and in the punishment of the evildoers. Art is not concerned with logic, for we accept unhesitatingly the fairyland of *Midsummer Night's Dream* or of *The Demigods,* a land in which causal and temporal relations are set "topsy-turvy."

For art's lack of concern with science we may postulate two alternatives: (1) Either the problems of edification, morality, logic or scientific verification have not yet arisen when art comes into being, or (2) the problems arising out of these sciences (to use the term generally) with which art deals have already come under control and have been afforded a sufficient solution to allow the artist to utilize them.

The first view, that art is antecedent to science and concepts, is held by Croce.[24] We have already indicated the necessity for other purposive activities upon which art is dependent. Moreover, on such a supposition as that of Croce, the contradiction obviously exists that without the concepts of space and time, the individuation of the art object is impossible.[25]

[24] *Aesthetic,* Ainslie's *trans.*, p. 26: "The relation between intuitive knowledge or expression and intellectual knowledge or concept, between art and science, poetry and prose, cannot be otherwise defined than by saying it is one of *double degree.* The first degree is the expression, the second the concept: the first can stand without the second, but the second cannot stand without the first."

[25] Croce, *loc. cit.*, p. 4: "We have intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a sky, the colour of a feeling, a cry of pain, ——."

Since art is not identical with science nor antecedent to it, science must, in some sense, precede it and make it possible. Moreover, we may only conclude that art takes as material that which has been brought under the control of science or, to express it otherwise, the function of art is to preserve and hold up for our perception the science of the past. Art manifests the control of man over nature.

Fundamentally, this is the position held by Kant in his theory of the sublime and by Schiller in his "play-impulse theory." For it will be realized that for Kant the only possibility for an aesthetic response to objects that aroused emotion (and by definition we have ruled out those that do not) is the assumption that reason demonstrates its power through the practical faculty and through mathematical control over material that at first seemed to be overwhelmingly beyond the grasp of man's understanding or physical power. In Schiller's case, man is only man when, through art, he secures control over nature as sensation and impression.

The history of aesthetic has manifested a tendency to accept Schiller's solution rather than that of Kant in regard to the method by which art demonstrates such control. Rather than accept the difficulties of the relation of science to art, it has accepted the differentiation between material content and form.[26] Nevertheless, this position involves a contradiction, for the "formal element" is quite clearly a matter of visual lines, balanced spaces filled with sensuously attractive and moving colors, kinaesthetically moving relations between figures and groups.[27]

However, on the next page (5), we find "what intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and time, but *character*, individual physiognomy." Compare, for criticism, Katherine Gilbert's essay in *Recent Aesthetic Tendencies*.

[26] *Vide* Schiller, *Briefe* 22: "In einem wahrhaft schönen Kunstwerk soll der Inhalt nichts, die Form aber alles thun . . . . Darin also besteht das eigentliche Kunstgeheimniss des Meisters, dass er den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt; und je imposanter, anmessender, verführerischer der Stoff an sich selbst ist, je eigenmächtiger derselbe mit seine Wirkung sich vordrängt, oder je mehr der Betrachter geneigt ist, sich unmittelbar mit dem Stoff einzulassen, desto triumphierender ist die Kunst, welche jenen zurückzwingt und über diesen die Herrschaft behauptet."

[27] Bosanquet's criticism of the doctrine is thoroughly to the point: "There is a difficulty in the psychical distinction which this doctrine of semblance may be held to involve. How can one kind of sense-perception be set down as semblance and another as reality? Why should visual or

Since Schiller's division of art into form and content is untenable, we must endeavor to find the control which is science not in form but, through an examination of art, in the characteristics of the aesthetic response.

The aesthetic response has been established as emotional in character. We turn, then, to the emotions to ascertain wherein we shall find the traces of science and, ultimately, the solution to our antinomy.

Plato most clearly voices the aversion of those who would avoid classifying our response to beautiful objects of art with the common emotions associated with desire for food, drink and sexual love. In the *Hippias Major*,[28] the Platonic position merely emphasizes the view that the classification of the pleasure in the beautiful with the pleasures in sex, etc., is abhorrent to common sense. But Plato has another argument that runs throughout the *Dialogues* like a thread connecting the theory with the theory of ideas and in this respect the history of philosophy has followed upon the Platonic tradition. Our response to beauty is rational, the tradition states. If, indeed, art appeals to the emotions, such an appeal is degrading, for the emotions form that portion of man's soul that is irrational. Moreover, the irrational soul secures its data from the sensations and, it will be remembered, must be curbed in its willing by the reason.[29] It is to the rational soul that one must turn to evaluate the full dignity of

---

auditory sensations be taken to belong to form, while those of taste, smell and touch are set down as giving sheer reality? Surely the one group are as 'objective' or 'subjective' as the other!—'Reality,' he says, 'is the work of things; semblance is the work of man.'—but clearly as it stands the antithesis tells us nothing, *for every sensation is a reaction of our organism.*'' (*History of Aesthetics*, pp. 291–2, *abridged. Italics* mine.)

[28] ''But if this man of whom I speak or anyone else whosoever should ask us: 'Hippias and Socrates, did you make the distinction that in the category of ''the pleasing'' that which is pleasing in the way you mention is beautiful, whereas you say that that which is pleasing according to the other senses—those concerned with food and drink and sexual love and all such things—is not beautiful. . . . Why, then,' he will say, 'if they are pleasures no less than the others, do you take from them this designation, and deprive them of being beautiful.' 'Because,' we shall say, 'everybody would laugh at us if we should say that eating is not pleasant but is beautiful, and that a pleasant odour is not pleasant but is beautiful, and as to the act of sexual love, we should all, no doubt, contend that it is most pleasant but that one must, if he perform it, do it so that no one else shall see, because it is most repulsive to see.' '' (298 *et seq., abridged.*)

[29] *Cf. Phaedrus*, 254–5.

man. By implication, if the beautiful appeals to the emotions, it appeals to that which is common to both man and animal.[30]

The full implication of this theory is found in Spinoza: "Man's inability to moderate and restrain the emotions, I call Bondage, for a man who is subject to the emotions is not his own master."[31] Interpreted literally, this view is to the effect that when urged by passion or emotion, man loses control of himself and is not accounted completely responsible for his acts. Moreover, to luxuriate in one's emotions, as one would in enjoying art, would be to give way to the very licentiousness to which Plato referred in *The Republic*.[32]

If we turn to a modern interpretation of the emotions, the conclusions given by classical philosophy seem completely to be borne out. For if the aesthetic response be of this kind we may include it within the following postulates concerning the emotions:

1. The emotions are closely allied to certain type-reactions, commonly called instinctive.
2. The relation of the emotions to the instincts makes their function an atavistic one and allies man closely to the "brute world."

We may add as a corollary:

3. To art, the appeal of which is essentially sensuous and evocative of the emotions, postulates 1 and 2 are especially applicable.

The expression of the emotions reveals "a life of inflexible habitual, or type reactions."[33] The expression of the emotion

[30] *Theatetus* (186c.):

"Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly,—through education. . . . Then knowledge is not in the sensations but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation."

[31] *Ethics*, Bk. 4, Preface.

[32] *Cf.* ante, pp. 3–4.

[33] E. A. Singer, Jr., *loc. cit.*, pp. 264–5. Compare William James, the Emotions, *Principles of Psychology*, Ch. 25 (p. 442): "In speaking of the instincts, it has been impossible to keep them separate from the emotional excitements which go with them. Objects of rage, love, fear, etc., not only prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke characteristic alterations in his attitude and visage, affecting his breathing, circulation, and other organic

of defiance, for example, is described by Darwin[34] as the characteristic and unvarying behavior by which a situation is met. In McDougall's words,[35] "Such instances of purely instinctive behaviour illustrate clearly its nature. In the typical case some sense impression, or combination of sense impressions, excites some perfectly definite behaviour, some movement or train of movements which is the same in all individuals of the species and on all similar occasions—"

To this class of reaction belong the stopping of the heart's beat when we see a dark form in the woods, the general avoidance of dangerous situations, the breaking forth of sweat and the capillary actions of the hair in fear, and the lifting of the fist when we are struck. So typical are these reactions and so unvarying that they must be viewed as having their source in "certain neural dispositions or coördinations of reflex arcs laid down by heredity."[36]

This instinctive reaction serves the purpose of adapting the individual to the more complex and significant features of the environment. As will be seen, they constitute the *Appercepzionsmass* of experience. But at the moment, we must point out that there seems to be little difference in the inflexibility of the principal instinctive reactions by which a man meets a given situation and those reactions as they appear in the brute. We must postulate such reactions as the basic and fundamental way by which the mechanism seeks to control its environment—a means common both to beast and man. For the capillary action of the

---

functions in specific ways. . . . Instinctive reactions and emotional expression thus shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well." McDougall, W., may be cited as well. In *Social Psychology*, 12th edition, (p. 47), he writes: "Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it; and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the effective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion." To this he adds (*loc. cit.*, p. 50), " . . . popular speech recognizes the connection of the emotions with the instinct that determines the movements of flight in giving them the one name *fear.*"

[34] *The Expression of the Emotions*, p. 249. "The upper lip being retracted in such a manner that the canine tooth on one side of the face alone is shown, the face itself being generally a little upturned and half-averted from the person causing offense."

[35] McDougall—*Soc. Psych.*, pp. 25–6.

[36] Allport—*Soc. Psych.*, pp. 42–43.

hair, the baring of the canines, the raising of the arm, seem, at first sight, in no way different from the "type" reactions of, for example, the herds of cattle, cited by von Hartmann,[37] which fear the stingless variety of gadfly more than the stinging variety, because the stingless variety cause festering wounds. As von Hartmann points out, this knowledge could not have been acquired in the experience of the individual animal, since the deposits of eggs and the festering of the wounds are separated by a long period of time. Nor do man's instinctive reactions differ from the terror displayed by the young chimpanzee at the first sight of a snake; or from the cautious approach of ferrets toward poisonous varieties of snakes, although the same ferrets will approach incautiously non-venomous varieties. The reaction is no different from the action of the beetle Sitaris, which lays its eggs at the entrance of the underground passage of the bee, Anthophora: The larva springs on the male bee, remains until the "nuptial flight," transfers to the female bee and waits until the eggs are hatched. It then eats the eggs and is metamorphosed to the insect: "Everything happens as if . . . the Sitaris itself knew that its larva would know all these things."[38]

For to both the reactions we have described in humans and in animals we may give James' definition of an instinct as "[that which] is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance."[39]

It is obvious, therefore, that an appeal to the emotions, such as that made by art, is an appeal to that which is animal in man's nature, an appeal to that which has been transcended, for however essential such reaction once was, it is now but one of many means by which men may control a given situation. It is an appeal to that which is atavistic and a reversion to the brute from which man has evolved. It will be seen from the quotation given from Lange,[40] that if this were the sole nature of art, it would be doomed to the function of stirring up in the nature

[37] *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 9th edition, Vol. 1, p. 86. (*Vide* entire Chapter 3.)
[38] Bergson, H., *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 158.
[39] Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Ch. XXIV, p. 383 (ed. 1891).
[40] Lange, *The Emotions*, pp. 81–82 (ed. *Psychology Classics*, 1922).

of man reactions necessary for a primitive rather than for a civilized state:

> Individuals as well as races are subject to a greater degree of emotion, the lower their position in society.
>
> The so-called savage races, when racial peculiarities do not act in the opposite direction, are more violent and unrestrained, more excessive in their joy, more subjugated by sorrow, than civilized nations. The same difference occurs between the various generations of one and the same race; we are calm and tame compared to our barbarian ancestors, whose greatest delight lay in working themselves up to an insane rage for battle, but who, on the other hand, were so depressed by misfortune as to end their lives for a mere bagatelle. . . . The surest sign of "refinement" is the self-control with which educated persons bear misfortunes that would call forth outbreaks of passion in the uneducated.
>
> The repression of emotion during the progressive education of individuals and of generations proceeds hand in hand, not only with advancing development of mental life, but is also a result of this development. . . . Education acts along the same lines. The aim of all education (which must not be confused with instruction) is to increase self-control and the opposition or suppression of the impulses, which are the immediate effects of our bodily organization, but which do not fit into established social conditions.

This apparent degradation of art to a low and brutish state might well cause the lover of beautiful objects to exclaim, with Synge's beggars in *The Well of the Saints,* if this be the sight of the truth, "it's a good right ourselves have to be sitting blind."

If, however, we return to the statement of the problem given at the outset, we discover that the tale has been but half told. We recall, there, that genius in art functioned "to set our human family apart from the humble herd of the brutes" and its method "is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves." From the time of Longinus to the present day, critics have not only made art the peer of man's greatest endeavors but they have sensed that there is an element in it that produces an ecstasy or transformation that sustains man in his struggles to attain to a higher state. It is the curious paradox of art that that to which it appeals is that which allies us to the brute and yet, despite that very alliance, few men may escape the feeling of exaltation and the resurgence of their vital powers, the encouragement to greater efforts after the best of art has presented itself to them. When the poet writes

> The years like great black oxen tread the world,
> And God the herdsman goads them on behind
> And I am broken by their passing feet,[41]

or

> Seven resistless captains o'er a shield
> Blackbound with hide have slit a bullock's throat
> And dipped their fingers in the bullock's blood
> Swearing a mighty oath by War and Havoc
> And Panic, bloodshed's lover,[42]

or

> Ossa then upon Olympus they strove to set, then upon Ossa
> Pelion, ashiver with leaves, to build them a ladder to Heaven—
> Yea and indeed they had done it.[43]

we ask, not like Voltaire, "Was it I who wrote that?" but "Was it I who felt that?"

But this "having been moved out of oneself" follows not alone from poetry. Prose like that of Malory[44] has the same effect:

> Then the king made the barget to be holden fast, and then the king and the queen entered with certain knights with them, and there he saw the fairest woman lie in a rich bed covered unto her middle with many rich clothes, and all was of cloth of gold, and she lay as though she had smiled,

as has that of Browne:[45]

> To subsist in lasting monuments, to live in their productions, to exist in their names and praedicament of chymera's, was large satisfaction unto old expectations, and made one part of their Elysium. . . . Tis all one to lye in St. Innocent's Churchyard, as in the Sands of Egypt: Ready to be anything, in the extasie of being ever, and as content with six foot as the *mole* of Adrianus.

Goethe felt it before the Cathedral at Strasburg:[46]

> How often has the evening twilight interrupted with friendly rest the eye fatigued by its exploring gaze, when the complete parts melted into complete masses, which simple and great, stood before my soul, and my powers arose gladly at once to enjoy and understand.

The paintings of an El Greco, the sculpture of a Michaelangelo, and the dance of a Pavlowa,—these tell the same tale. Moreover,

---

41 W. B. Yeats, *The Countess Cathleen.*
42 Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes.*
43 Homer, Od. XI, 315.
44 *L'Morte d'Arthur.*
45 Sir Thomas Browne, *Hydriotaphia or Urn-burial.*
46 *von Deutscher Art u. Kunst.*

the cooler analysis of the philosopher, the historian and the statesman may be added to the protest of the too-often incoherent artist that art is not degrading but, rather, is uplifting.

That art is not necessarily degrading has been recognized even by those to whom history points as its bitterest opponents. It is one thing to frown upon an art that is "immoral" or "irreligious" and it is quite another to condemn art completely. One need not seek far for examples: The refusal of the Christian Fathers to countenance painting and sculpture was actually an attempt to root out idolatry and to destroy paganism.[47] Once that aim had been accomplished, the Church became the patron of the arts, and, to that patronage we owe the Gothic cathedrals, the early drama,[48] and the period of Renaissance painting and sculpture.[49]

These are, indeed, but partial reasons for the inclusion of art in society but a more positive attitude grows as the moralistic one is deprived of its force. Art comes, indeed, to be considered an activity of man which has a value of its own. After telling us that a two-dimensioned painting has given up claim to practical and scientific significance, L. W. Flaccus writes:[50]

[47] B. Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic,* pp. 124–125: "It is quite natural that the great artistic craft which is rooted in necessity and does not intentionally represent imaginative ideas, should be the one to maintain itself through the inrush of uncultured peoples into Christendom and through the disputes and misunderstandings of a creed, prone to the heresy that the spirit is essentially hostile to the flesh. Including those crafts of decoration which do not necessarily deal with the human figure, *and therefore escape questionings aroused by anthropomorphism,* architecture was well able to represent and carry forward the impulse of freedom and individuality, which was one day to find a fuller expression in the achievements of painting, music and poetry."

[48] Pollard, A. W., *English Miracle Plays, Moralities, and Interludes: Introduction* (particularly that portion dealing with the origin of modern drama in the Christmas Day, Easter, and Corpus Christi representations in the Church). Out of these grew "dramatic representations . . . popular in their aim, liturgical in their origin, taking as their subjects events which belonged strictly either to sacred history or to accepted legends." (p. xiii.)

[49] Even in the case of Plato, who has been said to have exiled the poet from the Republic, it must be remembered that these same poets secured inspiration from the gods (*Apology,* 22c). A. E. Taylor's remarks are pertinent: "We shall not appreciate his (Plato's) position unless we understand quite clearly that the connection between aesthetic taste and morality is so close that whatever tends to ennoble our aesthetic taste directly tends to elevate our character, and whatever tends to foster a taste for the debased in art equally tends to deprave a man's whole moral being." (*Plato,* p. 280.)

[50] *The Spirit and Substance of Art,* p. 62, *abridged.*

> The world of art is a sensuously and imaginatively reshaped world in which there is an initial flattening of things to shapes, and then a giving to these shapes something of our own wealth. . . . Intellectual and imaginative values are given a sensuous form which is felt to have a reality and worthwhileness of its own; and which in turn, like a magnet, gathers to itself other values.

Art, then, not only has value but "gathers to itself other values." An examination of these other values, from the historical interpretation placed upon them, reveals them to be not only positive but of the very nature that lends art an uplifting quality. By art, man is carried to higher levels. A clear enunciation of this attitude is voiced by Rostovtzeff, in *A History of the Ancient World:*[51]

> It was the first appearance of the so-called Homeric poems, during their first spontaneous expression over the Aegean islands and Asia Minor, which made the Greeks conscious that they were a nation. Through these poems and through their mighty culmination in the Iliad and Odyssey . . . the Greeks gained a clear conception of their national unity and realized the racial peculiarities of their life and religion. . . . The individual character of the national genius is seen with especial clearness in the region of thought and art, where local patriotism, far from hindering the development of personality, in many cases, even encouraged it. The communities were just as proud of their great thinkers and artists as of their champions who won prizes at Olympia. . . . Much more did they make mention of those who created their own civilization—that civilization which distinguished them from all "barbarians" who spoke no Greek. Greece was proud of them, and with good reason: They laid the foundations of all our modern civilization, which is as individual as that of Greece.[52]

So strongly have men felt this inspiring quality in art that they have supported, at times, the contention that the sole function of art is the production of certain moral social effects.

---

[51] p. 231, *abridged.*

[52] The most cursory examination of history affords examples indicating man's recognition of the fact that art's influence upon life is uplifting and not degrading. Grote tells us that Pericles felt the necessity for beauty in Athens so strongly that he used funds raised for the defense of the city to erect the Temple of Athena and the Parthenon. In the words of the historian, Pericles sought out Pheidias—"Pheidias, the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions whereby Pericles imparted a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city."

The Renaissance affords many instances of the attitude outlined above. As one example, Vasari writes that Lorenzo d' Medici "grieved that in his time there should be found no great and noble sculptor who could take rank with the many painters of high fame and merit then existing, and he resolved to form a school."

Ruskin[53] goes so far as to state that fine art has three functions. These he finds to be the functions of enforcing the religious feelings of men, perfecting their ethical state, and doing them a material service. But the nature of art's "onward and upward" influence is neither pedagogical nor ethical. For as Longinus[54] clearly said, "the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves. . . . For our convictions are usually under our own control, while such passages exercise an irresistible power of mastery—"

Despite the fact that art may not teach, the opinion of a Lorenzo d' Medici or of a Rostovtzeff is not mistaken. Art usually pushes us forward. At the outset of our argument[55] it was stated that "there is no example of an art that does not appeal to our emotions. To be successful, art must move us." As Singer has pointed out,[56] this implies that "art moves us out of ourselves" and this, in turn, implies that "to be thus 'transformed' can mean primarily nothing more than to be thrust into a new class of those classes teleologically defined. It is, then, to be changed as to one's purpose; it is to enter on a world in which things are revalued." As the author continues: "The movement art sets free must be *toward a new heaven,* a new end or kingdom of ends."

Our analysis of art has brought forth two seemingly incompatible views. They may be restated as follows:

1. Art appeals to the emotions and these emotions in turn, produce "type" or group reactions instinctive and atavistic in nature. The emotional appeal of art is therefore an appeal to man's lower nature and is degrading.
2. The art that recalls the past pushes us forward to new goals, "a new heaven" and inspires us to the formation of higher values.

The antinomy of art is clearly seen. It may be expressed in various ways: How can art be uplifting while yet its appeal is to that which is base and degraded in man's nature? Art's in-

[53] *Oxford Lectures.* Compare Tolstoi, *What is Art?* (particularly p. 495, ed. J. Crowell and Co.) and Prall, *Aesthetic Judgment,* p. 281.
[54] *de Sublimitate,* I.
[55] p. 9.
[56] *Esthetic and the Rational Ideal,* Journal of Philosophy, II, p. 263 *et seq.*

fluence upon life is "onward and upward." That which the appeal of art presupposes, is the vestige of a life more primitive than the life to which it would appeal. In what way can the artist, by looking backward, make *us* look eagerly forward?

History reveals at least one general method by which the recall of the past, of that which has been transcended and left behind, may be of value in spurring one on to progress, to further conquests and to the seeking of new ends. Facing difficulties, one spur to effort is to recall one's past triumphs.

To the man faced by seemingly hopeless odds, whether the odds be disease, threatened defeat or extinction itself, the most inspiring thought he may have is the remembrance of an identical or a similar difficulty, accompanied by the recall of his triumph. The method is well exemplified in classical literature: Aeneas,[57] on the coast of Libya, encourages the Trojans, "worn with toils and spent with woes":

> Endure and conquer!—
> With me, the rocks of Scylla you have tried
> Th' inhuman Cyclops, and his den defied.
> What greater ills hereafter can you bear?

The *locus classicus* for this type of inspiration by the recall of past conquests is found in Caesar's *de Bello Gallico,*[58] for there not only the recall but the effect of that recall is given. It will be remembered that panic had seized the men in the Roman army, for Gauls and traders had "affirmed that the Germans were men of a mighty frame and an incredible valor and skill at arms." Convening a council of war, Caesar says

> What, pray, have you to fear? Why do you despair of your own courage or of my competence? We have made trial of this foe at a time our fathers could remember, on the occasion of the defeat of the Cimbri and the Teutoni by Gaius Marius . . . Even if no one else follows, I shall march with the Tenth Legion alone.

And what of the effect of Caesar's recall of past conquest?

> By the delivery of this speech, a marvelous change came over the spirit of all ranks, and an utmost ardour for action took possession of them.

[57] *Aeneid,* B. 1, line 198 *et seq.*
[58] Book 1, 39–42, *abridged.*

But, surely, it will be said, what has this to do with the progress implied in art? Not all beautiful objects have as their subject-matter events of the nature of Velasquez' *"The Surrender at Breda"* or of Browning's *"Saul."* Moreover, if art were limited to such subjects, its function would be pedagogical. It is obvious, therefore, that the past conquests recalled by art will not be related to a detail like the subject chosen for portrayal and, unlike the conquest recalled by Caesar, it will be a generalization of the term "within the memories of the fathers."

The relation of the emotions to the instincts leads us to our third postulate:

The instincts function as a means of recall, as a form of memory of the general racial type.

If we return, for a moment, to the examples of instinctive behavior of which the emotions are an expression, we observe not only that such reactions are common to man and to the brute, but also that in neither man nor brute does the behavior arise from education, training, nor experience within the conscious memory of the individual. Yet, in each case, whether it be the reaction of fear, in man or beast, characterized by the capillary action of the hair, or disdain, characterized by the baring of the canine tooth, or the action of the beetle *Sitaris,* to which we have referred, the behavior was directed toward an end as if the situation had been experienced before. In the case cited by von Hartmann, the fear exhibited by the herds of cattle for stingless varieties of gadflies could not have been acquired in the experience of the individual, since the time elapsing between the deposit of the eggs and the festering of the wounds is of such length as to preclude this possibility.

Such instinctive and typical reactions indicate, then, a recognition of a situation, accompanied by a behavioristic means of meeting the situation.

From the universality of the reaction within a species, the general similarity of the reaction within the group composing that species, and the lack of necessity on the part of the individual to produce the reaction consciously, one may only conclude that the instinctive type, of which the emotional expression or behavior is an integral part, constitutes a portion of the ap-

paratus with which each individual enters the world of experience.

If now, we ask the function of this apparatus, our reply must necessarily be "recall" or "memory." Not only is this view forced by such statements as the following by McDougall:[59]

> Among the lower vertebrate animals, also instinctive actions, hardly at all modified by intelligent control, are common. The young chick runs to his mother in response to a call of peculiar quality and nestles beneath her; the young squirrel, brought up in lonely captivity, when nuts are given him for the first time, opens and eats some and buries others with all the movements characteristic of his species; the kitten in the presence of a dog or a mouse assumes the characteristic feline attitudes and behaves as all his fellows of countless generations have behaved. Even so intelligent an animal as the domesticated dog behaves on some occasions in a purely instinctive fashion, when, for example, a terrier comes across the trail of a rabbit, his hunting instinct is immediately aroused by the scent;

but the full force of the position can be felt if we refer to what is perhaps the central problem of epistemology. Plato's description of the mathematical demonstration to the slave-boy in the *Meno* may be generalized: To recognize must mean to know again. To know again, is to remember what one once knew. Without such recognition, the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible, for the first impression would literally be perceived as nothing and, in like manner, since the 1000th impression would resemble the first impression, it too would be unrecognizable.

An *Appercepzionsmass* is needed. Even the biologist, who has insisted upon the inability of the *genes* to carry characteristics apparently hereditable, has come to see his own difficulty.[60] The instincts constitute all or a portion of that congenital equipment without which experience could not begin.[61] From their univer-

[59] *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, (12th ed.), p. 25.

[60] J. S. Haldane, *The Philosophical Basis of Biology*, p. 130 *et seq.*: "We can thus now trace life from generation to generation; but we cannot similarly trace personality. Inheritance of personality is, however, a very evident fact; and the very circumstance that there is an intervening stage during which we cannot trace it does not alter the fact . . . The memory which is inherited is the characteristic manner in which records are made, read off, and acted on. This manner can only be interpreted psychologically, and it seems to me that we must conclude that memory in this sense, as well as what else is included in personality, is directly inherited.

[61] Compare McDougall, *loc. cit.*, p. 29: "The instinctive action [also] implies some enduring nervous basis whose organization is inherited, an innate

sality, from the fact that the reactions do not require practice or training, and from their invariability, we infer that the instincts correspond to what Bergson has called "pure" memory:[62]

Nous revenons ainsi, par un long détour, à notre point de départ. Il y a, disions-nous, deux mémoires profondément distinctes: l'une, fixée dans l'organisme, n'est point autre chose que l'ensemble des mécanismes intelligemment montés qui assurent une réplique convenable aux diverses interpellations possibles. Elle fait que nous nous adaptons à la situation présente, et que les actions subies par nous se prolongent d'elles-mêmes en réactions tantôt accomplies tantôt simplement naissantes, mais toujours plus ou moins appropriées. Habitude plutôt que mémoire, elle joue notre expérience passée, mais n'en évoque pas l'image. L'autre est la mémoire vraie. Coextensive à la conscience, elle retient et aligne à la suite les uns des autres tous nos états au fur et à mesure qu'ils se produisent, laissant à chaque fait sa place et par conséquent lui marquant sa date, se mouvant bien réellement dans le passé definitif, et non pas, comme la première, dans un présent qui recommence sans cesse.

The introduction of the instincts as "pure memory" in the response to art allows for an adequate solution to many of the most vexed problems of aesthetic. It is, first of all, a generalization of Aristotle's statement that "recognition" is one of the

or inherited psycho-physical disposition, which, anatomically regarded, probably has the form of a compound system of sensori-motor arcs;" and the following quotation from Walter Frost, *Naturphilosophie*, Leipz., 1910, 1, 199–201, (quoted by Professor Singer in "The *Esse* of Minds *Percipi*"):

"When we propose the idea of a physiological *a priori* we assume in the brain of man at birth a certain preparedness for reacting in set ways to the impressions of the outer world. Just as the new-born child feels within itself a nutritive instinct, without ever having found by experiment that food stills hunger; just as it applies itself to the breast without being able actually to know that there it will find the needed milk,—just so are there intellectual instincts. The psychical acts of comparing, combining, abstracting may be nascent in the human mind before it has had a thought (Gedanke) back of the child's turning to the mother's breast. This way of acting is equivalent to the thought that there nourishment is to be had. Many of the deepest and most intelligent thoughts that come to us in later life define themselves no more clearly in their first germination. If it be but admitted that our conscious thinking may be traced back to this border of the unconscious, that beyond this in some last faint glimmer of consciousness a thought may be divined, then perhaps we might venture to say: In that first instinctive stirring of the child lies misty and as yet latent an *a priori* thought. . . . But not to give unnecessary offense to those who ascribe to pure mentality a meaning independent of physical reference, it were better to avoid the word physiological? Let us say then: There is a small but all-essential store of experience handed on at birth from parent to child. We may leave it to each to think as he will how this transfer is effected —whether its manner is physical or psychical."

[62] *Matière et Mémoire*, p. 164, ed. 1908.

fundamental pleasures of art.[63] More than that, however, it allows for a complete explanation of the otherwise inexplicable phenomenon by which the art of the past can be appreciated or responded to by one living centuries later than the period in which the art was produced. It accounts for the necessary recurrence of fundamentally broad and simple situations in the drama, for the retention of the modes in architecture and for the fact that, in spite of our difficulty in recreating the life of a period, we may respond to its art. The pleasure of recognition is there but it is a recognition of subject-matter incorporated in the memory of the race.

It is thus that art, in Hegel's words, allows men to "recognize in it their own dominating essential reality." The poets have recognized the place of the instinctive, unconscious source of their inspiration.[64] Lowell, in *Columbus,* writes, curiously reminding one of Plato's story of Socrates:

> And I believed the poets; it is they
> Who utter wisdom from the central deep
> And listening to the inner flow of things
> Speak to an age out of eternity.

One of the most interesting illustrations of the function of this "pure" or "unconscious" memory is to be found in the long-recognized similarity of *Hamlet* and the *Oresteiea.*

To ask the question, why *Hamlet* should be a tragedy for us as well as for the Prince of Denmark is more than a mere academic query. The "times are out of joint," surely, in Denmark, but that is past history, even if it be history. Neither the particular situation, the regal court, nor the particular problem may be reconstructed. Externally, Hamlet himself is neither like us in his garb nor in his experience. But were this all, how curious

---

[63] *Poetics,* IV, 5: "The reason men enjoy seeing a likeness is that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, 'Ah, that is he.'"

[64] Sophocles said, "Aeschylus does what is right without knowing it." Compare Carlyle, *Characteristics:* "Of our thinking, we might say, it is but the mere upper surface that we shape into articulate thoughts; underneath the region of arguments and conscious discourse, lies the region of meditation; here, in its quiet mysterious depths, dwells what vital force is in us; here, if aught is to be created, and not merely manufactured and communicated, must the work go on."

and strange would be the figure who waited upon the wind-swept ledge at Elsinore to pose questions to his father's ghost. It is the assumption that for us, too, "the times are out of joint," that makes this situation not a particular but a universal one. Thus the tragedy that overwhelms the royal family is felt as a tragedy by us and *Hamlet* is comprehensible.

To what do we owe this recognition that the tragedy is ours as well as Hamlet's? Only to the supposition that within our past experience the sources of this tragedy have a place. We may best demonstrate our point by tracing *Hamlet* back to its sources, while at the same time taking a case so analogous in Greek literature that one might suppose the English version borrowed from the Hellenic, though no proof may be brought to the establishment of this view.

A. C. Bradley noted the similarities of Hamlet and the story of Orestes[65] and, more recently, Gilbert Murray has devoted an essay to a more minute examination of the subject.[66] Although there is no trace of literary borrowing, the two dramatic versions have retained the following identical situations:

1. In the northern and in the Greek versions, the hero is the son of a king who has been murdered and succeeded on the throne by a younger kinsman. The dead king's wife has married the murderer. The hero, driven by supernatural commands, undertakes and carries through the duty of vengeance.
2. In all the versions, the hero is in some way under the cloud of madness.
3. One of the greatest horrors about the father's death in both traditions is that he died without due religious observances.

These are instances striking enough but there is one analogy the significance of which has not been sufficiently emphasized: Gertrude is a wife who loves her husband and bears him children, and then is wedded to his slayer and equally loves him, and does it all in a natural and unemotional manner. In the version of *Hamlet* by Saxo Grammaticus, Hermutrude, Amlothi's wife, behaves in the same manner as his, Amlothi's, mother has done. In Thebes, King Laius and his wife Jocasta knew that their son would slay and dethrone his father. Laius orders the son's

[65] *Vide Hegel's Theory of Tragedy* in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, p. 77.
[66] *Hamlet* appears in the *Gesta Danorum* of Saxo Grammaticus, etc. Compare Gilbert Murray's *The Classical Tradition in Poetry*.

death, but the child is saved by the Queen-mother, and, after slaying and dethroning his father, he marries her.

The similarities of the two versions, with no trace of conscious literary borrowing, are more than mere coincidence but even though they were no more than that, the conclusions to be drawn would still follow. For we are indicating a solidarity, not only of tradition, but of reaction to situations in art which point to an epistemological problem. There is more than sufficient evidence, however, of a common or similar source of these fundamental situations in *Hamlet* and in *Oresteica*. Of the latter, the researches of Murray, Harrison, and others indicate that the source is the ritual story of the vegetation spirits described in Fraser's *Golden Bough*:[67]

> Each Year-King comes first as a wintry slayer, weds the Queen, grows proud and royal, and then is slain by the avenger of his predecessor.

Greek tragedy has its origin in the *molpe*, the ceremonial dance and song centering around the cult-worship of the god, Dionysus.[68] Dionysus, the life-spirit, combined in the cult-worship the qualities of the bearer of the fruits of the New Year and those of the Scapegoat, who was driven from the community, taking with him the sins of the people. The ceremonial called for the tearing to pieces of the god and casting forth of his remains. In the Spring, the god returned, reborn and vigorous.

If we trace the sources of *Hamlet* in a similar fashion, we are met by a similar cult-ceremonial, with practically identical religious significance.[69] The earliest known reference to Hamlet

---

[67] See Frazer, G. B., *The Magic Art*, II, Ch. 18.

[68] See Gilbert Murray's *Molpe* in *The Classical Tradition in Poetry*. Compare Murray's *Excursus* to J. E. Harrison *Themis* (Cambridge, 1912), p. 341 *ff.*, and F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, particularly p. 53 *et seq.*

Just how much of the original religious character is retained by drama may be pointed out in the customary death and overthrow of the tragic hero and the almost invariable promise at the end of the tragedy of resurrection. Moreover, it will be remembered that Hamlet is at once the murderer of his uncle and of Polonius as well as the saviour of Denmark just as Orestes is the Matricide and the redeemer of the House of Atreus.

[69] The problem involved here was recognized in the last century by Shakespearean scholars. Gollancz, in his *Introduction to Hamlet*, pp. xxvii–viii, may be quoted:

"If, however, in spite of the absence of evidence to support the view, it be maintained that the Hamlet-tale was originally connected with the Or-

is contained in Saxo Grammaticus' reference to the *Skaldskofermal* of Snorri Sturlason, of about the year 980. In Saxo's version[70] the following passages should be noted:

"Most infamous of women," says Amlothi, of his mother, Gerutha, "dost thou seek with such lying lamentations to hide thy most heavy fault! Wantoning like a harlot, thou hast entered a wicked and abominable state of wedlock, embracing with incestuous bosom thy husband's slayer. . . . This forsooth, is the way the mares couple with the vanquishers of their mates." (p. 91)

"Pity also my stricken mother, and rejoice with me that the infamy of her who was once your queen is quenched. For this weak woman had to bear a two-fold weight of ignominy, embracing one who was her husband's brother and murderer." (p. 99)

"Disdain the dust of him who slew his brother, and defiled his brother's queen with infamous desecration—and crowned patricide with incest. I have been the agent of this first vengeance; I have burned for this righteous retribution. . . . It is I who have wiped off my country's shame; I who have quenched my mother's dishonour; I, who have beaten back oppression; I who have put to death the murderer;—Acknowledge my service, honour my wit, give me the throne if I have earned it, for you have in me one who has done a mighty service, and who is no degenerate heir to his father's power; no fratricide but the lawful successor to the throne; and a dutiful avenger of the crime of murder. You have me to thank for the recovery of the blessings of freedom, for the release from the power of him who vexed you, for relief from the oppressors—I have deposed the despot and triumphed over the butcher." (p. 99)

Hermutrude marries Amlothi and despite her desire to be

"united with her lord in death"—"she kept this rare promise ill; for when Amlothi had been slain by Wiglik in battle in Jutland, she yielded herself up unasked to be the conqueror's spoil and bride."

---

wendel myth, those who favour nature-myths have here an excellent opportunity for the display of their ingenuity. 'The first hero ever born,' as Orwendel is described in the preface to the old German *Spielmanns Gedicht*, was certainly, as his name implies, a radiant god of dawn or of spring; and does not Saxo make him battle with and ultimately slay King Collerus, *i.e.*, King Cold? He kills him in a 'spring-tidewood,' and in due course is himself slain by his own brother, and avenged by his own son. The hapless Gerutha, the giant-mother 'Groa' of the Edda, is Mother Earth, who in the forced embraces of cruel Winter longs for the return of her beloved Spring. . . . Even so, the Hamlet story may very well have borrowed certain elements from the ancient Northern myths of the struggle between Spring and Winter; from this point of view, the most difficult element of the whole story, the part played by the hero's mother becomes illuminated."

[70] Oliver Elton's translation.

The analogies to the Orestes' stories are clear. But Saxo Grammaticus derived his material from the *Elder Edda.* This, in turn, was of dramatic origin.[71] Miss Phillpotts in *The Elder Edda,* has arrived at conclusions which are interesting:

> There is no mistaking the significance of these scenes. The flyting, the slaying, the love-scenes are the integral parts of the most widespread drama of the world. It represents the eternal contests of the Old and New Years and has outlasted heathendom because the fulfillment of its aim is the age-long desire of the peasant. Its primary object is not commemorative but magical, and it is performed in order to induce the earth to bring forth abundantly. . . . The moral conflict, the family feud, the love-scene and the hint of rebirth,—these are the tragic formulas with which we have to deal, and they are inexplicable except as springing from the soil of the ritual marriage and the slaying.

And of the similarities of Hamlet's sources and the beginnings of the Orestes' stories, we may quote Miss Phillpotts' conclusion:

> Our northern Helgi plays, however rudimentary, however shattered, do afford another instance of Tragedy as an independent growth. There can be little doubt that this growth, though independent, springs from the same seed as Attic tragedy. The Fertility-drama bequeathed to both a plot which contained in germ the moral conflict, the sense of Destiny and the religious background and the essential characters of Greek and Northern tragedy.

We find, then, that there is every reason to suppose that *Hamlet* and *Oresteiea* retain the elements from which the stories took their beginning; stories forming a foundation for a ritual drama that centered around a fertility ceremony. The plays may even owe their similarity to a pre-Aryan homogeneity of Northern and Southern people.

But what of the presuppositions of the homogeneity indicated by the analogous ritual of Greek and of Scandinavian? In tracing the sources of the ritual that involves the conception of a scapegoat, the cannibalism involved in the eating of the god, and particularly the distaste for and the probibition of incest,

---

[71] Phillpotts, *The Elder Edda;* p. 114: "The continual recurrence of stock scenes is, of course, characteristic of primitive drama. We hardly need to be reminded that the flyting, the love scene, the slaying and the resurrection are to this day the main scenes of folk-drama. . . . The Norwegian Eddic poems bear the unmistakeable stamp of dramatic origin. . . . These poems are the actual shattered remnants of ancient religious drama."

we have arrived at that particular situation in the development of man's social relations that marks, according to the anthropologist and sociologist, the beginning of the matrilineal or patrilineal social structure, with its implications of property rights, inheritance and rules and regulations for marriage and family relations. For, in the story of Dionysus, preserved in the tragedy of *Hamlet* and in the plays concerned with Orestes, are the remnants of what in all probability constitutes the breakdown of the older organization of man under the *aegis* of that supreme individual called by Professor Elliott Smith "The Old Man." In this earlier organization, the primal horde is dominated by the father, who keeps all of the females for himself and drives out the growing sons. In Freud's reconstruction of the situation,[72] "one day the expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. . . . Of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of his strength." To this cannibalism, the young males add incest with their mothers. "They hated the father who stood so powerfully in the way of their sexual demands and their desire for power, but they also loved and admired him." The combination of hatred and remorse for the deed produces the worship of the father as a totem. The new society, composed of equally powerful brothers, introduces the prohibition against incest, since a return to the primal horde in its prior conception would have meant a reiteration of the patricide and the breaking down of the new society. So religion and ethics come into being, with their basis in hunger and sex. It is in this instinctive situation that one finds the foundation for the reactions to the Greek and English tragedies . . . the *Appercepzionsmass* necessary for their comprehension. In tracing the stories to their beginnings, the *mythos* reveals the patricide, the animal worship, and the sacramental feast. Through it, we may introduce recognition necessary for art. But we must also remember that in this recall of a primitive state, there are implications of man's brutish

[72] *Totem and Taboo,* p. 233.

origin so clearly atavistic that one might well repeat with Bergson:[73]

> [Of] the impression we get after seeing a stirring drama, what has interested us is not so much what we have been told about others, as the glimpses we have caught of ourselves.—A whole host of ghostly feelings, emotions, and events that would fain have come into real existence, "*but fortunately for us, did not.*"

For if (as is true) it is not an historical incident concerning Elsinore or Mycenae, which stirs us deeply and to which we referred in *Hamlet* or the *Agamemnon* but the old magic ritual going back to Indo-Germanic times, we may well ask upon what ultimate source does the solidarity and continuity rest. The elements of this ritual magic, rationalized into a religion by the concept of an external agent who dies and returns regenerated, who aids in the fertilization of crops, and who it is hoped will answer prayers, are clearly seen to be present in behavior of the subhuman but cognate branches of the primates, where already the rationalization has begun. For, to take our illustrations from Köhler's studies of apes,[74] among these primates we find (a) the group solidarity analogous to that of the primal horde;[75] (b) the leader;[76] (c) the rudiments of prayer, the idea of sin and of an indebtedness to be paid, excommunication and the bargaining necessary for a return to the group, involving the elements of group communion and ritual.[77]

---

[73] *Le Rire*, abridged, Eng. trans., p. 160; *italics mine.*

[74] *The Mentality of Apes.*

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 293: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a chimpanzee kept in solitude is not a real chimpanzee at all.—The group connection of chimpanzees is a very real force, of sometimes astonishing degree. This can clearly be seen in any attempt to take one animal out of a group which is used to hanging together. When such a thing has never happened before, or not for a long time, the first and greatest desire of the separated creature is to get back to his group."

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 293: "It matters a great deal who the returned ape is. The oldest animal, who occupied a special position in the life of the community, was, on any such occasion, greeted by a universal welcome, such as was not accorded to others."

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 293–5. Included here, as Gerald Heard points out in *The Social Substance of Religion*, are the elements of the idea of ritual: If the group "remained indifferent, as is often the case, the separated animal stretched his arms imploringly towards them, and, as they did not respond, he threw small objects towards them, including often, portions of his own hair."

Heard asks, "Can we go deeper and learn anything from the ape group under normal conditions?—One of the best observed (examples of behaviour)

These seem to be the full implications of the atavistic, emotional instinctive elements of art. In recalling them, art follows the analogy offered by Caesar in the passage quoted. But our problem still remains, for how can the recall of a brutish past allow us to care for the second postulate of art—that it spurs men on to future conquest, that it instills men with the desire to create, that it is a factor in civilization?

If we revert to the words of Caesar, we discover a second element in his exhortation: "But what on earth was there to fear? Or why did they distrust their own courage? The measure of the enemy had been taken at a time their fathers could remember, when the Cimbri and the Teutoni were defeated? . . . "

If our analysis be correct, the relation of the emotions to the instincts supplies the recollection of the past analogous to Caesar's exhortation that his men needed. But an element is lacking and it is that very element that caused Caesar's speech to have the effect he desired: "After this speech a marvelous change came over the spirit of all ranks, and an utmost ardour for action took possession of them." This utmost ardor—this mood of courage that pushes men on to new goals and to new triumphs—this, too, is analogous to the effect of art upon men. The cause of the ardor in the case of Caesar's men is apparent: "The measure of the enemy had been taken at a time their fathers could remember." For men recall that they have conquered apparently insuperable difficulties in the past and so face the future, conscious of their strength.

Art, too, must reveal this memory of past conquests, if our analogy hold true, for the well of art is no receptacle for forgetting nor does it afford escape from the difficulties of life. Rather, it is the source of courage to face new difficulties.

One of the best methods of indicating past conquest would be the evidence afforded by the retention of some means to an end

centered around food.—When one member, generally one of leading ability, was striving to attain food placed where only protracted effort could win it, sympathetic urgency was expressed by all others who looked on. They would sit round, and as the principal actor strained toward his objective, the arms of the others, though their bodies sat still while they gazed rapt at the critical achievements, waved and gestured in sympathy, repeating in social echoes and ripples the motions which at the centre achieved the prize. —Here clearly is the unreflecting urgency to express, the affective need which will create ritual, before any clear intention, any shadow of purpose can be present."

whose function has been lessened or lost through replacement by other and better means to the same end. That is, the end remains the same: Man is the focus of desire and his goal is the attainment of any end in the world he may desire. Accompanying this ideal end is the ideal means—"that something you would have to have whether you wanted to bisect a line or break a safe, or do anything else in the world."[78] This ideal means is what? "The condition of attaining any end in the world is such control of the world's machinery as shall give you the power to get what you want."[79] The ideal of science is "the increase of power—a never ending progress."[80]

We have insisted upon the relation of art to the emotions and of the emotions to the instincts. If we return to our analysis of the instincts we find that they constitute the physiological apparatus by means of which man and beast, in an inflexible way and without previous experience, react to situations in order to secure the object of their desires, *i.e.*, preservation, reproduction, pleasure, the avoidance of pain, etc. Viewed in this light, the instincts represent one of the means to the end of control of nature.

The instincts represent one means of control, but as the ideal means to the ideal end, *i.e.*, "the condition of attaining any end in the world by such control of the world's machinery as shall give you the power to get what you want," the instinctive life contains a factor which, essential to its nature in the beginning of life's history, in its later development becomes a handicap to man's increase of his control over nature. The instincts as means are inflexible. The behavior dictated by the physiological basis for the instincts drove man as blindly and as regardless of consequences as, for example, it drives the lemmings headlong into the sea to their deaths, moved as they are by irresistible instinct to follow routes long since submerged. As the lemming, driven by instinct, goes to its death, as the cat delays the kill to play with the mouse, so when instinct is followed blindly, man suffers.

[78] E. A. Singer, Jr., *On a Possible Science of Religion, Phil. Review,* Vol. XL, No. 2, p. 116.

[79] Singer, *op. cit.*

[80] For this analysis of science and of the control of nature, see E. A. Singer, Jr., *The Philosophy of Experiment, Symposium,* Vol. 1, No. 2, April, 1930.

The instinct of the Northern Indian is to hate and fear the Eskimo. The old tribal instinct causes him to disdain imitating his enemy in building snow houses or in training dogs to pull burdens. Of this nature are the "culture lags" caused by deep-rooted instincts.

Such inability on man's part to vary means to end would have meant a continued servitude to nature, for its very inflexibility would have meant that variations in the environment would have caused destruction. But, upon examination and analysis, the emotions, which are the observable expressions of instinctive reaction, indicate that man has in the past controlled nature and has varied the means to the end. We are still faced by situations involving fear, disdain, etc., but the reaction, which still retains its full force in animals, has undergone alteration:

"Some movements of expression [of the emotions]," writes William James,[81] "can be accounted for as *weakened repetitions of movements which formerly* (when they were stronger) *were of utility to the subject.* Others are similarly weakened repetitions of movements which under other conditions were *physiologically necessary effects.*"

Two factors are implied: (1) With the increase in man's scientific knowledge, certain features of nature now produce only a weakened emotional response, which once was essential. That is, there has been an increasingly large selection and classification of natural events and objects, to which we react by instinct but which are no longer feared, decried, etc., as they once were. (2) Through the development of more flexible means to ends the emotions have been controlled or altered in such a way that they are to be differentiated from the similar reactions of man's predecessors or of the brutes. A developing faculty in man has relegated the once essential emotional reaction to a secondary place.

We can discover ample evidence of the truth of these hypotheses. If we turn to Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions,* we find, for illustration, that the actions of animals when enraged are accompanied by or expressed by emotional reactions necessary for existence. After describing this behavior, *i.e.,*

[81] William James, *The Emotions* (ed. *Psychology Classics*), p. 128.

the reddening of the face, the labored respiration and the dilation of the nostrils, he writes:

> But animals of all kinds, and their progenitors before them, when attacked or threatened by an enemy, have exerted their utmost powers in fighting and defending themselves. Unless an animal does this act, or has the intention, or at least the desire, to attack its enemy he cannot properly be said to be enraged.[82]

But the behavior of animals and of man differ in degree:

> Our early progenitors, when enraged would probably have exposed their teeth more freely than does man, even when giving full vent to his rage, as with the insane. We may also feel almost certain that they would have protruded their lips when sulky or disappointed in a greater degree than in the case of our own children, or even with the children of existing savage races[83]
>
> The expression here considered, whether that of a playful sneer or ferocious snarl is one of the most curious which occurs in man. It reveals his animal descent; for no one, even if rolling on the ground in a grapple with an enemy and attempting to bite him, would try to use his canine teeth more than his other teeth. We may readily believe from our affinity to the anthropomorphous apes that our male semi-human progenitors possessed great canine teeth.—We may further suspect, notwithstanding that we have no support for our analogy, that our semi-human progenitors uncovered their canine teeth when prepared for battle, as we still do when feeling ferocious or when merely sneering at or defying someone, without any intention of making a real attack with our teeth.[84]

These, and similar illustrations which might be adduced, can only mean that man has progressed past the stage in which the emotional reaction is the sole means of securing his desires. Similarly, it is that very conquest of past difficulties, which is what the artist presents to us, that pushes men on to new conquests. We are forever presented with situations at once fearful, disgusting, etc. But we have developed other means to our end of control. What is this other means?

The decreasing function of the emotions is correlated to an increasing power of the reason whose ultimate expression in the apportionment of means to end is science. For where the emo-

---

[82] *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (ed. D. Appleton and Co., 1896), p. 74.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 363.
[84] *Ibid., Expression of Emotions,* p. 253.

tional-instinctive means to end is inflexible, that of science is flexible and variable, selecting the proper means to the end, with the one restriction that "*A question not answerable by experiment is meaningless.*"[84a] For it is the function of the experimental scientist "to contrive endless experiments that shall bring him nearer and nearer to those single-valued answers his questions of fact demand."[85] Secondly, whereas the emotional-instinctive reaction is fixed in its response to a given situation, science functions to cast out hitherto possible situations no longer valid. For, beginning with the assumption that "No given observation can exclude the permissibility of at least one mechanical image[86] of a natural system observed," we arrive at the conception of science,

> which would render every stage of our experimental knowledge in terms of that "bundle of mechanical images," any last experiment must have left permissible; it would then picture the progress of that knowledge as a gradual *squeezing out* of images proved non-permissible.[87]

Thirdly, science and the emotional instinctive reaction differ in this, that science postulates an infinite reduction of error and only the increasing rationalization of the emotions controls the immediate reaction to the situation:[88]

> Here is a physicist devoting his life to a task whose ultimate completion depends on his ascertaining the real length of a thread—as it might be, a pendulum suspension. He can measure the thing, of course, but no one is more careful than he to make explicit his understanding, that the result of his measurement is far from being the real length of the thread he is measuring. How far? Why, his actual attainment is remote from the ideal reality he is after by all the distance of experimental progress that lies between a mean-reading with probable error greater than zero and a mean-reading with probable error zero.
>
> This "fact"—"the limiting conception of a mean-reading with probable error zero" is essentially unattainable. Experimental method bases itself pragmatically on the postulate that, however small the experimental error attached to any given reading, a reading with smaller error "can always be obtained;" but the very meaning of that article of laboratory religion

[84a] E. A. Singer, Jr., *Philosophy of Experiment*, in *Symposium*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 156.
[85] *Op. cit.*, p. 160.
[86] Mechanical image defined as in *Symposium, loc. cit.*, p. 161.
[87] *Symposium*, p. 165–6.
[88] E. A. Singer, Jr., *On a Possible Science of Religion*, p. 113.

which prescribes for all measurements a series of readings taken to a decimal place in which they do not agree—the very meaning of this prescription involves the implication that in no finite progress can science attain a reading with probable error zero.

In this scientific endeavor, progress is a function of the selection of the proper means to the end desired. Whereas, in the instinctive stage, man was dependent upon his emotional reactions and the behavior accompanying them, there is now the control of objects as means to distinct ends, those ends in turn directed to the ideal of a complete control of nature.

The scientists' method, given above, consists in the "squeezing out" of images. But the scientist whose method we have delineated is the ideal scientist who represents the advance, slow but certain, of all scientists and whose results are group results. As the ideal is slowly formulated, the egoistic desires are rationalized for the sake of the advancement of the group. It clearly comes to be realized that one's own desires are furthered by (a) sacrifice and (b) the subjection to examination of matters formerly outside the scope of science which are, as science advances, brought in as images to be tested and tried. Thus, in the first place, "the war of all against all" is given up for the establishment of group institutions. In the latter case, as science gains clarity, the old fear of external agents gives way to the assumption that given perfection of means there will remain no portion of nature outside man's control.[89]

And as science, with its increasing selection of means to defined ends and its decreasing dependence upon instinctive and uncontrolled action, relegates to a secondary place the instinctive and emotional life of man, there is a corresponding growth in the demands of society that the emotions be brought under control. For

> The free expression by outward signs, of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree.[90]

[89] *Vide* Appendix B, for an historical illustration of the scientific method and its relation to ethics and art.

[90] Lange, see previous quotation, p. 22.

But the progress of science is an infinite progress, accompanied by an increasing rationality and a diminution of emotional behavior. The traces of the latter, weakened but perceptible, are found in the expression or behavior of an individual under emotional stress. Some expressions, like that of fear, retain much of their original strength.[91] It is, in all likelihood, due to the divergence in the degree to which the particular emotions or group of emotions have been controlled and rationalized that the "aesthetic types" arise. As has been indicated, the appeal of art is to the emotions but the artist may vary at will the material he selects. For example, an appeal to a less completely rationalized emotion, like fear, is necessary for the conflict and suspense essential to "the tragic." More concretely, the fear aroused by insanity, by the destructive forces of nature or by moral conflict constitutes tragic material, because fear is one of the most deeply fixed of the instincts and its objects have offered the greatest obstacles to science. Where the control, on the other hand, has become well-nigh perfect, the artist, pending the selection of the proper material and a sufficient technique, will produce what is termed the "formally beautiful."

If, now, we seek the physiological apparatus producing the feeling of exaltation that constitutes the principal factor in art for Longinus and recalls progress, we find the source in the identical muscular reactions which have been described. These reactions are our behavioristic responses to situations arousing our emotions. But, it has already been indicated, such muscular reactions are weakened repetitions of movements once necessary and an examination of the responses themselves, for instance, the dilation of the nostrils and the erection of the hair, are in the nature of muscular preparation for exertion no longer essential to that situation or largely replaced by a better means to the given end.[92] But the aesthetic response, with its accompanying

[91] Darwin, *loc. cit.*, p. 362. "We may likewise infer that fear was expressed from an extremely remote period, in almost the same manner as it now is by man; namely, by trembling, the erection of the hair, cold perspiration, pallor, widely opened eyes (etc.)."

[92] Herbert Spencer saw in this both the relation of art to play and the nature of aesthetic response itself. Compare *Prin. of Psych.*, p. 535. "The general nature and position of the aesthetic sentiments will be made more clearly comprehensible by observing how the aesthetic character of a feeling is habitually associated with separateness from life-giving functions.—There

exaltation, is not due to the "diffusion of normal stimulae" in a playful way but to (a) the sense of progress associated with the replacement of the necessity for this reaction by one more rational and (b) by the mood of creation so clearly essential to the aesthetic response.[93]

Here, then, is the resolution of our antinomy. For in his appeal to the emotions, the artist awakens feelings and instincts which are atavistic and, in non-aesthetic cases, may be harmful. The aesthetic response arises not because there is an excess of energy to be expended with no reference to its prescribed end. Rather, its source is the consciousness that, due to the perfection of means to ends by science, *this* means, the emotional-instinctive one, necessarily called forth by art because it is the nature of art to be a creation in a sensuous medium, is no longer necessary although remaining as an indication of progress. We are aware of this progress through art by the muscular reaction that constitutes the behavior we may observe in the individual's response to the situation. But the muscular reaction, as has already been pointed out, appears as an emotional expression in weakened form. It is no longer necessary to react to the situation in that way but instinct produces the reaction.

In this muscular reaction, no longer useful for the end it once fulfilled, we find then the basis for the emotional response to art and the source of the feeling of exaltation. Their concurrence in art caused an antinomy. We tread here on well-known ground, for in this muscular adjustment is the basis for the theory of empathy or *einfühlung*.[94] For in Lipps' words,[95] "the ground of the aesthetic satisfaction is in myself, a feeling of in-

arises a wide scope for pleasure, derivable from superfluous actions of the auditory faculty which are much dissociated from life-giving functions."

[93] It is not to the experiencing mind that the elements involved in the aesthetic response are apparent. It is to the reflective mind, observing the behavior of the one who experiences, that one turns for enlightenment concerning the problem. In the failure fully to appreciate the truth of this statement lie the reasons for the common supposition that the artist should be able to reveal aesthetic truth. Socrates falls into the error in the *Apology*. Occasionally a Wagner or a Rodin may combine the experiencing and the reflective mind and a philosophical aesthetic may result.

[94] The theory of empathy has been severely criticized largely because it has been said that the mere feeling oneself into an object affords no very distinguishable basis for an aesthetic response. This fault is cared for, I believe, by the implications in this thesis.

[95] *Archiv für die gesamte psychologie* 1. (1903.)

ner activity. But the outward completion of the movement may not emerge. . . . The chief feature of aesthetic imitation is that it aims at activity of the self.''

It is then in the muscular preparation for action that we discover the physiological basis for the sense of progress which is so essential an element in the aesthetic response. The artist presents us with a sensuous medium, involving a situation usually evocative of an instinctive reaction. Reason, controlling the instinctive reaction, has modulated the behavior once so essential but now replaced by other means and therefore less necessary than formerly. Moreover, in the concentration of our energies in the controlled reaction, we discover that element in the effect of art that has been discerned so often. For art produces a ''quieting'' effect. This is the result of the concentration of energy in the reaction, a concentration that eliminates the merely irritating and irrelevant factors of our experience in muscular preparation for an action which does not require completion.

It is in this preparation for movement and action that art performs its true function—''to create the creator.'' For to the worker and to the scientist, art comes not as an escape or as a lure to ease, but as the inspiration necessary to keep science at its endless task. Through art, science approaches its inexhaustible difficulties with the courage that comes from a recollection of the past conquests of nature by the group of scientists who have gone before. For art asks the scientist ''What is there to fear?'' Art has its answer in its very nature: ''The measure of the enemy was taken in the days of our fathers.'' If the problems of the present seem insuperable, art tells us that different foes, long since overcome, have presented apparent invincibility in the past. It is this recall of past conquest that causes art to produce ''the marvelous change in the ranks,'' this exaltation and ecstasy that marks man off from the brute.

The teleology of art is to move us, ''to appeal to our heart and mind.'' It functions, when it is truly art, to produce in us, ''the mood of conquest'' and the mood of courage. For it creates the creator, without establishing the end for which he works. It is the spur that causes him to continue his task of securing an increasing power. In the establishment of courage, there is set up, not an emotion, but a mood. The mood would be impossible

without art's presuppositions—appeals to love, to hate, to fear—the emotions of common experience. To this mood of courage may be applied the term, "aesthetic mood."

One philosopher has seen art in this light. For, to Hegel[96] art recalls men's past endeavors, an unfolding of *Geist,* and a token of men's past conquest:

> When the world of moral sense and sound religion has evolved into a world of rules and regulations, it sinks into a mood of comedy touched with melancholy and a sense of loss. Not only the immediate feeling of personal dignity, but the more reflective conception of personality is gone; and with them is gone all faith in eternal laws of God, in temporal pronouncements of oracles. The columned temples are dead carcasses from which the living spirit of belief has departed, and the words of hymns. The tables of the gods are empty of spiritual meat and drink, their festivals no longer bring that joyous sense of oneness with the heart of things. To the work of the Muses is lacking any urge of the spirit; of that spirit which would now shatter gods and men to win to some certainty of itself. Works of the muse are taken for no more than they are—fair fruits plucked from the bough. An amiable genius has served up these beauties as a maiden might offer us fruits. In these fruits, nothing would be left of the life that once flowed in them, nothing of the tree that bore them, nothing of the earth and elements that gave them substance, nothing of the climate that lent them qualities, nothing of the changing seasons that presided over their processes of growth. And just so with those works of art: the unfolding of destiny in giving them to us gives us nothing of their native world, nothing of the atmosphere of feeling in whose spring and summer they blossomed and ripened, nothing but an embodied memory of these moments. So too nothing we do to have enjoyment of these works of art is doing God's work, that work in whose doing men were wont to be filled with a consciousness of God's perfect and satisfying truth: our service to art is but a surface attention, such as might wipe from a fruit a drop of rain or a speck of dust. As to the moral life, there where once were inner elements, generating and life-giving realities, is now an elaborate framework of dead materials, facts of external relations, of philology, of history, etc. All this we have erected not in order to feel our way more deeply into that old life, but in order to hold before the mind a more definite picture of it.
>
> But then—the maiden who offers the plucked fruit is more than any nature displayed in fruit, its qualities and elements, its tree, air, light, etc., since she grasps all this in the glance of a conscious eye. And so is the inevitable unfolding of mind giving us a work of art more than any moral life and reality of a people, since it is the *re*-collection of that exhibition of a collective mind—it is the mind of a tragic destiny that collects all those diverse gods and attributes of substance into the one Pantheon—into the mind that knows itself to be mind.

[96] Hegel, *Phaenomenologie des Geistes,* 545/6 ie. 7 C, *Revealed Religion.*

APPENDIX A

Maritain is following directly in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas, who defines the work of art (*i.e.*, the beautiful object) as "Id quod visum placet," and "Nam ad pulchritudinem *tria* requiruntur. *Primo* quidem integritas, sive perfectio. Quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. *Et* debita proportio, sive consonantia. *Et* iterum claritas." Beauty for Aquinas, is, however, predictable ony of God and is one of the divine attributes: "Ex divina pulchritudine esse omnium derivatur." (Compare *Sum. Theol.* i, q. 3, a 4, i, q. 39, a 8, and *de Divinis Nominibus*, cap. IV; lessons 5 and 6 of the Commentary of St. Thomas.)

The idea of a concept of beauty apart from experience is derived from Plato, through Aristotle. It is clear that poetry and music affect us emotionally:

> *Republic*, Book 10: "Take the best of us listening to Homer or any other of the tragic poets when he is imitating a hero in grief or spinning out a long melancholy lamentation or imitating men singing and disfiguring themselves in grief. You know that he gives us pleasure, and we give ourselves up to following him; we sympathize and are seriously impressed, and *praise as a good poet whoever most affects us in this way*—." (A. D. Lindsay, *trans., italics my own.*)

However it is equally clear that while each individual work of art has this function, there exists in the world of ideas an "essence" in which beautiful objects participate. That this "essence" differs from the beautiful in artistic objects is clear, for we are told,

> "Nor again will that beauty to his eyes take on the likeness of a face or hands or any other fleshly part, nor of speech or learning, nor will it have its being in any living thing, nor in earth or in the heavens or in any other creature, but will have its simple and essential being ever one within itself." (*Symposium*, 210 E., abridged. W. R. N. Lamb, *trans.*)

It is obvious that this position is intolerable to Plato, for he tries to bridge the gap between the two positions. He writes that (a) beauty differs from the other essences or forms in that it is "that essence most manifest in the world;"

> *Phaedrus*, 250 C: "And the essence of beauty, as I have explained was revealed to us along with the other essences, but in this world it is beauty that we apprehend the most clearly, shining through the clearest of our senses. For sight is the sharpest of all our bodily senses.—But, as it is, beauty alone has this privilege, so that it is the most manifest and lovable of all things."

and (b) he clearly offers us in the *Symposium* a method by which we may approach this "transcendental":

> So when a man by the right method of boy-loving ascends from these particulars and begins to descry that beauty, he is almost able to lay hold of the final secret.—Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances,

> from observances to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the very essence of beauty.'' (*Loc. cit.*)

It is clear, therefore, that Plato is aware of the problem but his inability to offer a solution leads us to inquire concerning Aristotle's treatment of it. Aristotle accentuates the difficulty. Art, for him, is at once a copy of the universal and the cause of an emotional purgation in the partaker of the art.

> *Poetics,* 9: ''The historian and the poet do not differ by one writing in verse and the other writing in prose—the difference is that the one tells what has happened, the other what might happen. That is why poetry is a more philosophical and important thing than history, for poetry tells us rather the universal, history the particular.''
>
> *Poetics,* 5: ''Tragedy is a representation of superior and complete action of a certain compass, in embellished language of either kind according to the several parts of the play, in the way of action not of narrative, effecting by means of pity and fear the purging of such feelings.'' (Aristotle's *Theory of Poetry and the Fine Arts,* Butcher, *trans.*)

Compare ''The end of the fine arts is to give pleasure or rational enjoyment'' (*Met.* l. 981. b. 17 seq.) and ''Art is a faculty of production in accordance with a true idea.'' (*Eth. Nich.,* vi. 4. 1140 a. 16.)

APPENDIX B

The following illustration is given to indicate the relation between science and art. Two factors should be borne in mind:

1. The example offered is a fortuitous one. It is given merely to show:

(a) how science brings even the gods and death under its control;

(b) the dependence of moral concept upon science;

(c) the restrictions placed upon art by elements thought to be beyond man's control.

2. The example is intended to represent an analogy to a laboratory experiment. The Greek stage of development is given to indicate the author's idea of what constitutes progress in a society. The function of art in recalling science must, however, be found in the analysis of the emotions given in the body of the thesis.

A suggestion for the resolution of our antinomy is to be found in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*. The author asks, "How can the ugly and the discordant, the substance of tragic myth, excite aesthetic pleasure?" To one who, even in a dream, could be carried back to an Hellenic city, the answer comes:

> In walking under high Ionic colonnades, looking upwards to a horizon defined by clear and noble lines with reflections of his transfigured form by his side in shining marble, and around him solemnly marching or quietly moving men, with harmoniously sounding voices and rhythmical pantomime, would he not in the presence of this perpetual influx of beauty have to raise his hand to Apollo and exclaim: "Blessed race of Hellenes! How great Dionysus must be among you, when the Delian god deems such charms necessary to cure you of your dithyrambic madness!" . . . To one in this frame of mind, however, an aged Athenian, looking up to him with the sublime eye of Aeschylus, might answer: "Say also this, thou curious stranger: What sufferings this people must have undergone, in order to become thus beautiful."

"What sufferings this people must have undergone in order to become thus beautiful!" They must, indeed, have suffered. But they must also have remembered their suffering and to have conquered the nature that caused the suffering. It is in this progress that the solution to our antinomy is found.

Tragedy retained many of the elements of the cult ceremonial but before it could become art, man had to approach this material with the equanimity inspired by his increasing conquest of nature. To just the degree that the deities were subject to man's direction through his ceremonies, to just that degree was the ceremonial capable of becoming art. But such control is occasional and its results too dependent upon circumstance, the whim and caprice of priesthood, and the element of temporal fortuitousness. For art, the blind forces of nature, embodied in the gods, had to be stripped of their powers and nature itself had to subject itself to man's science.

As early as the Homeric poems "The Gods have become frankly human, and everything primitive is kept out of sight" (Burnet). Even in Hesiod's Theogony, "the ordinary man would hardly recognize his gods in humanized figures. . . . It is clear that many of the gods mentioned there were never worshipped by anyone, and some of them were mere personifications of natural phenomena, or even of human passions."

The progress that will be found in Greek tragedy will be an ethical one but one based upon and paralleled by purely scientific advances. "Tragedy was born when these old stories were retold by Aeschylus in the full consciousness that this demand for justice in an ordered universe was hard to reconcile not merely with old tales but with the facts of life." (*Cambridge Ancient History*, v. 5, p. 118.) Furthermore, there is progress within the work of each dramatist, as well as from Aeschylus to Euripides. In the Greek tragedy itself, there is a clear enunciation of the formula laid down:

Many a wonder lives and moves, but the wonder of all is man,
That courseth over the grey ocean, carried of Southern gale,
Faring amidst high-swelling seas that rudely surge around,
And Earth, supreme of mighty Gods, eldest, imperishable,
Eternal, he with patient furrows wears and wears away
As year by year the plough-shares turn and turn,—
Subduing her unwearied strength with children of the steed.

Antistrophe I

And wound in woven coils of nets he seizeth his prey
The aery tribe of birds and wilding armies of the chase,
And sea-born millions of the deep—man is so crafty-wise.
And now with engine of his wit he tameth to his will
The mountain-ranging beast whose lair is in the country wild;
And now his yoke hath passed upon the mane
Of horse with proudly crested neck and tireless mountain bull.

Strophe II

Wise utterance and wind-swift thought, and civic, social ways,
And shelter from the clear-eyed power of biting frost,
He hath taught him, and to shun the sharp, roof-penetrating rain,—
Full of resource, without device he meets no coming time;
From Death alone he shall not find reprieve;
No league may win him that relief; but even for fell disease,
That long hath baffled wisest leech, he hath contrived a cure.
(Chorus *Antigone*) l. 338 *et seq.*

But before such a progress is possible, the one capricious element, the one arbitrary factor in that world must be gotten rid of. The Gods must come under rule. The Zeus of the early play, *The Suppliant Women*, is described as follows:

Above him is no throne:
No prayers alone can bind
His doings, for the deed and the word are one,
And one the counselling mind (l. 596 *et seq.*)

with the added characteristic that

The God who ordereth Fate must yet know ruth. (l. 361)

But this prerogative disappears in *Prometheus Bound:*

Leader: Who guides the helm of That which Needs must be?

Pro.: The Erinys unforgetting, the Fates three.
Leader: Then Zeus himself, matched against these, is weak?
Pro.: The doom that is ordained he cannot break. (l. 511 *et seq.*)

That this spiritual development continues, one may indicate by reference to the *Agamemnon:*

Zeus, the guide, who made man turn
Thought-ward, Zeus, who did ordain
Man by suffering shall learn.
So the heart of him, again
Aching with remember'd pain,
Bleeds and sleepeth not, until
Wisdom comes against his will.
'Tis the gift of one by strife
Lifted to the throne of life. (l. 180 *et seq.*)

With Euripides, comes the final breakdown of the older conception that the gods, because they are gods, are neither to be judged, criticized, nor subjected to the laws that govern man:

Ion: Yet I must plead
With Phoebus—What ails him? He ravisheth
Maids, and forsakes; begetteth babes by stealth
And heeds not, though they die! Do thou not so!
Being strong, be righteous. For what man soe'er
Transgresseth, the gods visit this on him.
How were it just then that ye should enact
For men laws, and yourselves work lawlessness?
. . . Unfit it were
To call men vile, if we but imitate
What gods deem good:—They are vile who teach us thus.
(l. 436 *et seq.*)

The same sentiment is expressed in *Andromache:*

Thus he that giveth oracles to the world,
He that is judge to all men of the right,
Hath wreaked revenge upon Achilles' son,—
Yea, hath remembered, like some evil man,
An old, old feud. How then shall he be wise?
(l. 1162 *et seq.*)

The epitome of the newer view toward the old gods is contained, perhaps, in the *Elektra:*

We must believe no more
In Gods, if wrong shall triumph over right. (l. 584)

To destroy the older conception of a world ruled by the blind forces of nature or the wilful caprice of gods beyond the control of man marks a masterly advance. However, with this advance, the retention of the older view leads to a logical dilemma: For (1) if the legend is true, the persons of the legend are not gods; (2) if the legend is not true, the pantheon of Homer and of Hesiod is not to be supported.[1] With the destruction of the older

[1] Compare *Hercules Furens,* l. 1340 *et seq.*

"I deem not that the gods for spousals crave
Unhallowed; tales of Gods' hands manacled
Ever have I scorned, nor ever will believe,—
For God hath need—if God indeed he be—
Of nought: these be the minstrels sorry tale."

pantheon, another step forward must be taken and this step is revelatory of the progress in Greek civilization.

Compensating this breakdown of the older conception, new laws and rules, revealing a more scientific conception of man, come into existence:

1. Tragedy flows from human weakness or excess. It is not due to the intervention of the gods or to a blind fate. Man is a part of a system in which cause and effect are recognized. Responsibility must be accepted:

Aeschylus. *The Choephoroe*

> The House itself can deliver itself;
> The House hath healing for its own bitterness;
> Tis here within. None other can stay the flood
> Through bitter striving, through hate and old despair.
> (l. 469 *et seq.*)

The Eumenides

> All this hath my love's zeal done
> For my people: a home have I given
> In their midst to the mighty ones hard to be won,
> Yea, to them from whose lordship exempted is none
> Of mortals under the heaven.
> Who hath felt not their power knoweth not
> When calamity comes in his lot.
> Him sins long past in their chains bind fast,
> And hale him their bar before;
> And by silent Death is his clamorous breath
> Stilled evermore. (l. 923 *et seq.*)

Sophocles, *Elektra*

> Hads't thou the right to slay him? What high law
> Ordaining? Look to it, in establishing
> Such precedent thou dost not lay in store
> Remorse and sorrow for thyself. For if
> One die for one, thou first will be destroyed
> If Justice find thee. (l. 582 *et seq.*)

Euripides. *The Bacchae*

> Dionysus upon women will not thrust
> Chastity: in true womanhood inborn
> Dwells temperance touching all things ever more—
> (l. 314 *et seq.*)

2. Only voluntary actions are to be condemned:

Sophocles. *Oedipus at Collonus*

> How then
> Can this be justly a reproach to me,
> The child not yet begotten of my sire
> An unborn nothing, unconceived. Or if
> Born as I was to misery, I met
> And killed my father in an angry fray,
> Nought knowing of what I did or whom I slew.
> What reason is to blame the unwitting deed?
> (l. 970 *et seq.*)

3. The growth of a conception of justice superior to mere acquiescence to mere formal rules:

In the *Eumenides* (432), Athena addresses the leader of the Eumenides in the words:

Let no bare oath the deeper right subdue.

The growth of this conception of justice to include motive and intention, as well as the actual act, is the central problem of *Antigone.* Polyneices orders that Antigone's brother must lie unburied:

Proclaim that none
Must cover in a grave nor mourn for him.

Antigone breaks this formal rule. The populace is represented as giving its approval of the act. It is clear, furthermore, throughout the play that Creon's statement, "An enemy is hated even in his death," is increasingly untenable as a dictate of the Greek attitude toward other men. Moral judgments are transcending the stage in which there is one law for Greek and another law for barbarian. Motive or character comes to be the focus of the moral judgment:

I under shadow may o'erhear, how all
Thy people mourn this maiden, and complain
That of all women least deservedly
She perishes for a most glorious deed.

4. The growth of an impartial tribunal, dispensing justice and eliminating the "blood feud," as an essential characteristic of the state:

Eumenides: What if "blood with blood requite"
Where shall the limit of the horror lie?
By exile justify, not by blood. (l. 510 *et seq.*)

But, all I can, will I stand up for Law,
To quell this brute in man, this murder thrust,
Which ever more destroyeth lands and towns. (l. 513)

The actual machinery for justice is set up in the play:

Sophocles. *Eumenides* (l. 455 *et seq.*)

Choosing the worthiest of my people, I
Will found a court for homicides, to keep
Holy the law of oaths and last all time.
Summon your evidence, and supporting proofs.

Yet the few instances I have selected from the many that are available from the first play of Aeschylus to the full development of Euripides are indicative not alone of an ethical growth. Behind them and serving as the foundation for them is a growing science and philosophy which have not yet separated. Its character is remarkable not alone because, as the humanists say, interest centers upon man and casts the gods out. That this element is largely present is true and one may easily point to the introduction of proportions in architecture and in sculpture, in painting and in vases which are based upon the proportions of the human figure. Of vastly more importance than this is the factor that gods, men, and all objects of the experienced world and all postulates of the unseen world are first reduced to one world stuff and then, as the limitations of this material theory are seen, brought under one consistent theory of law and rule. Verral[1] puts the case of Euripides clearly:

> The creed of Euripides was that of nascent philosophy, science, and rationalism; between which and the worship of the popular gods there

[1] A. W. Verral, *Euripides the Rationalist,* pp. 73–4.

> was a war to which modern religious controversies offer no parallel. It was not merely that the current legends assumed as possible and true things which science rejected as incredible; but the whole character of pagan tradition, loose, fluctuating, unsystematic, varying between city and city, shrine and shrine, and ready even to accommodate itself by arbitrary modifications to different moods of the same mind, was fundamentally incompatible with regular and consistent *theory* of any kind. . . . The duty preached by the philosophers, and by Euripides as a public teacher known to be in sympathy with philosophers, was the duty of thinking on system, of not adopting without evidence or investigation, contradictory hypotheses on different days of the month or at different stages of a journey; a duty which, as was seen with ever increasing clearness, would if pursued make it impossible to use at all such conceptions as "Apollo," or "Artemis," or "Demeter," and reduce even "Zeus" to the position of an inconvenient and misleading name.

It is no mere coincidence that one may draw up a chronological list beginning with Thales and Anaximander and ending with the Sophists that will include, in addition to the Milesians, the Eleatics and Socrates, the names of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Phidias, and Praxiteles.

For the natural philosophy behind the ethical conceptions of the artists, one need not look far. For the growing tendency to bring the gods under the rule of law, there is the analagous position of Xenophanes—"There is one god, supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind," a position further extended by Heraclitus, who not only derides the gods of the old pantheon but supplies a law and a process of change in their place. The Milesians turn to natural phenomena rather than to gods for explanation; the Eleatics turn to "being." But the first philosopher, Thales, had reduced the tasks of the gods. In predicting an eclipse and in introducing mathematics from the east, he had secured control over nature, while the lesser gods, like Pan, lost their functions when the Pythagoreans could reduce music to mathematical ratios.

The conception of man's responsibility is based upon the position of man in nature and an increasing knowledge of the laws of cause and effect, of theory and practice. Antigone's problem is that of Democritus, for no longer can the line of barbarian, enemy and Greek be so strictly drawn. Throughout, the conception of freedom is the philosophical problem that Atomism attempted to meet with its postulates of materialism, which at the same time rid man of two fears, that of death and that of the gods—for were they not, like man, reducible to the atoms and were not the gods composed of the same material as was man? The poetry of the time, as it appears in drama, contains these philosophical suppositions.

If, at this point, we revert to *Hamlet* as our example of our theory that art recalls racial memories and yet inspires to progress, we may summarize our findings:

Hamlet, like *Oresteiea*, calls up emotions associated with the relations of man to primitive worship. Not all of the situations in *Hamlet* may be traced in this fashion, nor is it necessary that they be so traced. The appeal to our emotions are expressions of atavistic, instinctive reactions. But the mind,

agitated by these old fears, recalls that man's science has resolved the old problems, has laid to rest the old gods. Traces of the old rites still persist in the form of the art.

The uplifting quality of a tragedy like *Hamlet* is not due to any didactic quality in the play. It is due to a cessation of the one-time enthralling power of the emotions over our actions, a power weakened by the substitution of more varied and scientific means to ends as indicated in our brief analysis of Greek tragedy. If, by means of science, such control has been manifested in the past, what future obstacles can be placed in man's path which he will not overcome?

THE SCIENCE PRESS PRINTING CO.
LANCASTER, PA.